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When the Mitchell brothers partied, they partied hard. The
brothers, Artie andJim, were renowned for their pornographic film
and theater empire.' Although the Mitchells were notorious for
their carousing together, Jim had become increasingly distraught
over his brother's drug and alcohol habit, worried that it was
threatening their extensive business dealings. 2 Thus, when porn-
king Artie Mitchell's bullet-ridden body was found in the bedroom
of his California home, it came as little surprise to those who knew
them that Artie's older brother Jim was arrested near Artie's home
while trying to draw a concealed rifle on the responding officer.
3
The events that actually transpired inside the Mitchell house that
night remain a mystery. Jim claimed that the killing was accidental'
and that he could not recall any of the events surrounding the
shooting.5 Armed with circumstantial evidence, ballistics reports,
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' The Mitchell brothers' success was built around "an empire of adult theaters for
live sex shows and films." U.S. Porn King Sentenced for Killing Brother, The Reuter
Library Report, Apr. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File. Jim
and Artie Mitchell were well known prior to the murder because of their "flamboyant
exploitation of flesh [that] made them rich while they were still in their 20s." Carry
Abrams, Of Flesh and Blood: Another Scandal-This Time, Homicide-Shakes the Mitchell
Brothers' X-Rated Empire, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1991, at El.
2 Prosecutors claimed that Artie Mitchell was "in his last months caught in a spiral
of drug and alcohol abuse that... stimulated increasingly erratic behavior, disrupted
the business and provoked the killing." Abrams, supra note 1, at El.
3 See id. at E18.
" See Diane Curtis, Mitchell Trial Judge Approves Re-creating Slaying on Video, S.F.
CHRON.,Jan. 28, 1992, at Al ("Defense attorneys do not deny thatJim Mitchell fired
the shots that killed his brother, but they say the killing was accidental and not
murder.").
' See Diane Curtis,Jim Mitchell Testies About Fatal Shooting, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11.
1992, at A13 [hereinafter Curtis, Mitchell Testifies] ("[P]orn czarJim Mitchell ... gave
his first public accounting of the slaying of his brother Artie, testifying at his murder
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and the opinions of the Mitchells' friends, prosecutors set out to
piece together the events leading to the death of one of California's
most notorious citizens.
6
At about the same time that Jim Mitchell took the life of his
brother and business partner, another fatal incident involving
conflicting factual accounts occurred on the opposite side of the
country. Officer Gary Spath of the Teaneck, New Jersey, police
department was called to the William Cullen Bryant School to
investigate reports of a youth brandishing a gun.7 Upon arriving
at the scene, Officer Spath encountered a sixteen-year-old black
youth named Phillip Pannell.8
The subsequent confrontation between Spath and Pannell
ignited a heated conflict in the previously harmonious, racially
diverse community.' Neither side disputed the events leading up
to the fatal encounter. Following Spath's arrival on the scene, a
short chase on foot ensued.1" Spath then fired two shots, one of
trial that he remembers almost nothing about the shooting of his younger sibling and
partner."). Mitchell later stated that "he did not remember the shooting but had
gone to his brother's home to intervene in Artie's demonic and increasingly
dangerous alcoholism." Diane Curtis, Porn Kingfim Mitchell Gets 6-Year Sentence: He
Is Free Pending Appeal in Brother's Slaying, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 25, 1992, at Al
[hereinafter Curtis, Porn King].
6 See Richard Barbieri, Mitchell Prosecutors to Present Last 56 Seconds of Porn King's
Life: Testimony at Jim Mitchell Fratricide Trial Will Feature Shot-by-Shot Recreation, THE
RECORDER, Oct. 17, 1991, at 1. Jim Mitchell was eventually convicted of voluntary
manslaughter and sentenced to six years in prison. See Curtis, Porn King, supra note
5, at Al.
7 See Robert Hanley, Officer Acquitted in Teaneck Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1992,
at B7; Tracy Schroth, Teaneck Drama Opens: Some Props, No Guns, 130 N.J. L.J. 153,
153 (1992).
8 See Hanley, supra note 7, at B7; Schroth, supra note 7, at 153. Defense attorney
Robert Galantucci depicted Pannell, the victim of the shooting, as a "junior criminal,
already on probation and a member of a street gang." Melinda Henneberger, Science
vs. Emotion: Trial of Teaneck Police Officer Opens, N.Y. NEWSDAY,Jan. 16, 1992, at 21.
9 See RonaldJ. Fleury, Skirmish of the Experts Bedraggles Teaneck Case, 129 N.J. L.J.
269, 269 (1991) ("In the headlines, the manslaughter prosecution of Teaneck
policeman Gary Spath is about race, police brutality, and an ethnic protest that
evoked shades of Bensonhurst and Howard Beach [New York communities torn by
racial violence] in a quiet Bergen County suburb."); Hanley, supra note 7, at B12
(noting that "the night of unrest tarnished Teaneck's image as a racially harmonious
town"); Rorie Sherman, Moving Graphics: Computer Animation Enters Criminal Cases,
NAT'L LJ., Apr. 6, 1992, at 1, 32 ("The killing garnered national attention because it
sparked race riots in Teaneck, N.J., a town previously thought a model of harmonious
integration.").
10 See Schroth, supra note 7, at 153 (stating that witnesses at the scene noticed that
"[w]hen Pannell ran from the group, Spath and another officer.., took chase with
their guns drawn").
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which struck Pannell in the back, fatally wounding him." Upon
subsequent investigation, the loaded handgun that precipitated the
deadly engagement was found in Pannell's pocket.
12
In the aftermath of the shooting, the accounts of what prompted
Spath's decision to fire at Pannell sharply diverged. Prosecutors
indicted Spath on charges of reckless manslaughter, claiming that
Pannell had his hands raised in surrender when the fatal shot was
fired." Spath denied the charges, and countered that he fired in
self-defense, believing that Pannell was reaching for the concealed
firearm while "turning toward him in a threatening gesture." 4
As so often happens in criminal trials, the prosecution and
defense in both People v. Mitchell 5 and New Jersey v. Spath6 pre-
sented conflicting versions describing the factual scenario leading
up to the fatal events. 7 In order to obtain a conviction, prosecu-
tors in both cases were faced with the daunting prospect of piecing
together the exact circumstances of the killings based on conflicting
evidence and testimony."i To accomplish this task and to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 9 prosecutors in both cases
n See Hanley, supra note 7, at B7.
12 See Tracy Schroth, State Rebuts Defense in Teaneck Cop Case, 128 N.J. L.J. 1140,
1140 (1991).
is See id.
"' Robert Hanley, Science Cannot Duplicate Victim's Acts, Expert Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 1992, at B4.
"No. 12462 (Cal. Super. Ct. Marin County indictment filed Sept. 17, 1991).
16 No. SGJ263908 (N.J. Super. Ct. Crim. Div. filed Dec. 5, 1990).
17 In Mitchell's trial, the prosecution argued that Jim Mitchell murdered his
brother without provocation, alleging that he was upset that his younger brother's
drug and alcohol abuse was affecting their business partnership. See Abrams, supra
note 1, at E18. In contrast, Jim averred that Artie provoked the exchange by
confrontingJim with a bottle. See Curtis, supra note 4, at Al.
In Spath's trial, the prosecution attempted to prove that the victim had his back
turned to the officer and alleged that Spath had fired recklessly and without
provocation. See Schroth, supra note 7, at 153. The defense, however, countered that
the victim was turning toward Spath while reaching for the concealed weapon that
originally drew the officer to the scene. See Hanley, supra note 14, at B4.
" Spath elected to testify on his own behalf and forego his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. See Hanley, supra note 7, at B7. Spath's
testimony, in direct contradiction to claims of the prosecution, highlighted the
conflict between the stories. AlthoughJim Mitchell testified, his testimony centered
around his inability to recall the events of the evening. See Curtis, Mitchell Testiies,
supra note 5, at A13.
"' See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the U.S. Constitution
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials).
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commissioned the production of videotaped reenactments20 to
illustrate their version of the facts.2 1
Prior to the admission of the videotaped reenactments in the
Mitchell and Spath cases, the use of such reenactments in criminal
trials was largely rejected by state courts.22 The Mitchell and Spath
evidentiary rulings, which granted the prosecutions' requests to
present the reenactments to the jury,2 3 signify the beginnings of a
significant shift in judicial philosophy concerning the admission of
videotaped crime scene reenactments.2 4 In light of the recent
20 Videotaped reenactments are also known as video "reconstructions" or video
"re-creations." Throughout this Comment, the term "reenactment" will refer to any
form of videotaped re-creation of prior criminal acts.
In constructing a crime scene reenactment, prosecutors and experts are
"purport[ing] to show what actually happened, using data derived from
the ... investigation." MichaelJ. Henke, Admissibility of Computer-Generated Animated
Reconstructions and Simulations, 35 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 434,436 (1991). A reenactment
differs from a simulation because the latter is an "'artificially created extrapolation'"
that "takes known factual data... and 'continues the event beyond [its] stated
mathematical or factual basis' to show either what 'would have happened' under
different conditions or 'alternate theories of [how the event occurred].'" Id. (footnote
omitted). Although the reenactment is more speculative than the simulation, the two
are similar to some extent because both rely "on inductive reasoning, hypothesis, and
scientific assumptions." Id. at 437. Thus, the prosecutor and expert utilize physical
evidence, testimony, hypothesis, and experience to piece together the intricate details
of exactly how a crime occurred for presentation to the trier of fact in the form of
a videotaped reenactment.
2" See Curtis, supra note 4, at Al (stating that the judge in Spath's trial allowed a
re-creation of the shooting to be shown to thejury); Robert Hanley, Re-enactment Tape
Is Allowed in Officer's Trial, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 15, 1992, at BI ("The judge ... accepted
into evidence an unusual videotaped re-enactment.").
' See, e.g., State v. Trahan, 543 So. 2d 984, 997 (La. Ct. App. 1989) ("[The
videotaped reenactment] was inadmissible because the reconstruction did not
accurately depict the condition or the position of the parties."), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Simpson, 551 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (La. 1989), but aff'd, 576 So. 2d
1 (La. 1990); State v. Hopperstad, 367 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(overruling the trial court's admission of a videotaped reenactment depicting the
events surrounding defendant's arrest); State v. Caudill, 789 S.W.2d 213,216 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990) ("A videotape reenactment of a crime... where the victim reenacts the
crime with a third party playing the role of the defendant, should be and is hereby
declared inadmissible in Missouri."); Lopez v. State, 651 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1983) ("We find that any staged, re-enacted criminal acts ... involving human
beings are impossible to duplicate in every minute detail and are therefore inherently
dangerous, offer little in substance and the impact of re-enactments is too highly
prejudicial to insure the State or the defendant a fair trial.").
2- Although independent of one another, the admission of the reenactments in
both trials occurred within days of each other. The reenactment in Spath's trial was
accepted by the judge for presentation to the jury onJanuary 14, 1992. See Hanley,
supra note 21, at Bi. The use of the reenactment in Mitchell's trial was approved by
the court on January 27, 1992. See Curtis, supra note 4, at Al.
24 Many within the legal community have criticized this shift. See e.g., Curtis, supra
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judicial acceptance of reenactments in these two nationally
publicized cases and the rapid development rate of computer and
video technology, one commentator predicted that "[c]riminal trials
are on the verge of a technological revolution that will allow lawyers
to transform experts' dry, verbal testimony into dynamic, TV-like
shows that can mentally transport jurors to crime scenes and play
out for them an advocate's version of events."
25
This Comment argues that the use of videotaped reenactments
of crime scenes prejudices the rights of criminal defendants under
the balancing test of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence by
compelling the trier of fact to commit inferential error.2 6 Though
relatively instinctive in nature, the logic utilized by those courts that
have rejected the use of videotaped reenactments27 is correct in
assessing the prejudicial nature and effect of reenactments on juror
deliberations in criminal trials. The admission of videotaped
reenactments by the trial courts in Spath and Mitchell, therefore,
should be treated as anomalies in judicial reasoning by future courts
confronting the issue. Part I of this Comment articulates the
differences between demonstrative and real evidence and details the
treatment various forms of videotaped evidence have received in
both civil and criminal trials. Part I concludes by briefly outlining
the purported advantages of using demonstrative evidence at trial.
Part II begins by examining the use of videotaped reenactments
in civil trials. This Part then categorizes the reasoning employed by
courts when confronted with a civil reenactment and the potential
dangers that this form of evidence presents to litigants. The first
half of Part II sets forth several generalizations regarding the use
and acceptance of videotaped evidence at trial and shows how, as
note 4, at Al (quoting Professor Ellen Kreitzberg as "'shocked' that such a re-creation
might be admitted at a criminal trial" and saying that "'[t]his kind of technology... is
designed to appeal to those kinds of things that shouldn't be admissible'"); Sherman,
supra note 9, at 32 ("The unknown psychological impact [of videotaped reenactments]
worries some lawyers."); Rorie Sherman, Psychological Impact Is Unclear, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 6, 1992, at 33, 33 (noting that attorneys were concerned that when viewing the
reenactments "Olurors might be unduly influenced; extraneous information might
accidentally trigger juror biases; [and that] the material might contain subliminal
messages").
2 Sherman, supra note 9, at 1.
2 Rule 403 provides that evidence, "[a]lthough relevant.... may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
For a further discussion of Rule 403, see infra notes 209-38 and accompanying text.27Seesupra note 22 (discussing four state courts that have rejected such evidence).
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compared to other forms of videotaped evidence, civil and criminal
reenactments have been subject to a heightened level of judicial
scrutiny. The remainder of this Part examines in detail how courts
have treated reenactments in criminal trials and suggests that
advances in computer and video technology make it increasingly
likely that this form of evidence will continue to appear with greater
frequency at trial in the future. Finally, Part II outlines the logic
that various state courts have employed when confronted with crime
scene reenactments in an attempt to categorize the dominant
rationale driving their exclusion.
Part III discusses Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
presents the evidentiary basis for excluding prejudicial evidence
under the Federal Rules. This Part articulates the philosophy
underlying the Federal Rules and examines the impact of decisions
under the Federal Rules on the "law" of evidence. Part III then
turns specifically to Rule 403 and attempts to craft a definition of
"unfair prejudice," concluding that unfair prejudice is best defined
as occurring when evidence is employed that causes the trier of fact
to commit inferential error. Through an examination ofjudgmental
heuristics, this Part then attempts to determine which cognitive
processes subsequently cause inferential error. The cognitive
utilization of judgmental heuristics-both the availability heuristic
and the representative heuristic-is then applied to the viewing of a
videotaped reenactment by the trier of fact. The Comment
concludes that the prosecution's use of videotaped crime scene
reenactments unfairly prejudices criminal defendants.
I. DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE AND THE USE OF VIDEO AT TRIAL
A. Demonstrative Versus Real Evidence
Demonstrative evidence, defined as "any display that is principal-
ly used to illustrate or explain other testimonial, documentary, or
real proof,"2" plays a central and valuable role in both civil2 9 and
28 Robert D. Brain & DanielJ. Broderick, The Derivative Relevance of Demonstrative
Evidence: Charting Its Proper Evidentiay Status, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 968-69,
(1992) (footnotes omitted). Brain and Broderick note that demonstrative evidence
"is, in short, a visual (or other sensory) aid." Id. at 969.
Black's Law Dictionary defines demonstrative evidence as "[tihat evidence
addressed directly to the senses without intervention of testimony." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 432 (6th ed. 1990). One author considers demonstrative evidence to be
that which "re-creates events for a decisionmaker without intervening recitation other
than to authenticate the evidence." RICHARD A. GIVENS, DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
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criminal trials."0 It comes in many forms and types, varying from
mundane documentary evidence to visually stimulating demonstra-
tions.3" Classifying all evidence that is considered "visual" as
demonstrative, however, can be misleading.3 2
A further distinction must be made between purely demonstra-
tive evidence and real evidence. Real evidence "provides the trier
of fact with an opportunity to draw a relevant firsthand sense
impression" and "involves production of an object which usually...
had a direct or indirect part in the incident."3 3  Purely demonstra-
tive evidence, on the other hand, is derivative in nature, as it "only
illustrates or clarifies other substantive evidence." 4 Thus, real
§ 1.01, at 3 (1989).
2 See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text (documenting the use of
videotaped evidence in civil trials); see also Roland v. Langlois, 945 F.2d 956, 963 (7th
Cir. 1991) (holding that the lower court did not err in the admission of a life-size
model in an action brought by a carnival patron injured by an amusement ride).
s See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text (documenting uses of videotaped
evidence in criminal trials); see also United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1501 (1lth
Cir. 1985) (holding that the lower court did not err in allowing "the playing before
the jury of a silent videotape showing police executing [a] search warrant").
s' See GVENS, supra note 28, § 2.01, at 28-29. Givens notes that demonstrative
evidence can come in the form of "illustration charts, maps, photographs, audio and
videotapes, demonstrations, models, and experiments." Id. at 28 (footnote omitted).
The reenactments produced for the Spath and Mitchell trials would be considered
"visually stimulating" because they demonstrated the events in dispute with color,
lights, and movement. See infra part II.B.4; see also infra part III.E (discussing the
cognitive impact of demonstrative evidence).
32 See Brain & Broderick, supra note 28, at 981 n.74 ("It is a failure to appreciate
th~e] distinction [between real and demonstrative evidence] that has caused much of
the present day confusion surrounding demonstrative evidence. That is, instead of
acknowledging demonstrative evidence as its own branch of evidence, commentators
will often try to analyze it as a special application of real evidence.").
" Michael H. Graham, Evidence and Trial Advocacy Workshop: Relevancy and
Exclusion of Relevant Evidence-Real Evidence, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 241, 241 (1982).
Graham points out that real evidence may include "[m]urder weapons, narcotic
substances, and articles of clothing." Id. Thus, real evidence is that which is often
referred to as the "smoking gun" or the "bloody towel."
Real evidence must also meet a stricter evidentiary standard under the Federal
Rules of Evidence to be admissible. It must be authenticated according to Rule 901,
meet basic relevancy standards as outlined in Rule 401, and must not be prejudicial
as defined by Rule 403. See FED. R. EvID. 401, 403, 901.
34 Brain & Broderick, supra note 28, at 973 (noting that demonstrative evidence
is "entirely derivative of other evidence, and its only value at trial is when it is linked
to other substantive proof"). Graham explains that demonstrative evidence has "no
probative value in itself" and that "[s]uch evidence serves merely as a visual aid to the
jury in comprehending the verbal testimony of a witness or other evidence." Graham,
supra note 33, at 242; see also Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 579 (5th Cir. 1982)
("Illustrative evidence is admitted solely to help the witness explain his or her
testimony. Illustrative evidence has no probative force beyond that which is lent to
1994) 2131
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evidence, possessing independent probative value,3 5 may be carried
with the jury into deliberations. Demonstrative evidence, with no
independent probative value, may not enter the jury room.
Crime scene reenactments, which are postlitigation creations,
are purely demonstrative evidence, carrying no independent
probative value.3 6 One commentator points out that the evidential
weight of demonstrative evidence is weak because it is "self-
conscious evidence that comes into existence after the event,
through the self-help of the litigants, their lawyers, and their
graphics consultants.
"37
B. Videotaped Evidence as Demonstrative Evidence
Many types of demonstrative evidence have gained wide
acceptance in the courtroom.3 8 Videotaped evidence, a form of
demonstrative evidence, has received significant acceptance in many
forms as well.3" In civil trials, videotaped evidence has been used
to demonstrate scientific experiments or principles, 40 to depict the
scene of an area in dispute,4' to portray a "day in the life" of an
it by the credibility of the witness whose testimony it is used to explain.").
' See infra part III.C.2 (discussing probative value under the Federal Rules of
Evidence).
' See Brain & Broderick, supra note 28, at 965 (noting that demonstrative
evidence "has no independent effect on the determination of the existence of a fact
of consequence, other than its helpfulness as an illustrative aid to another,
independently relevant piece of substantive evidence").
"Ashley S. Lipson, "Real" Real Evidence, LrriG., Fall 1992, at 29, 30.
' See Brain & Broderick, supra note 28, at 962 ("Contemporaryjurists and lawyers
continue to share the historical vision that demonstrative proof can be used at trial
as a matter or right, subject only to the discretion of the trial judge to preclude
individual exhibits that are unfairly prejudicial, inaccurate, incomplete, or cumula-
tive.").
"See Gregory P.Joseph, Videotape Evidence in the Courts-1985, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 453,
453 (1985). Joseph, a current member of the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules of Evidence, notes that the "potential evidentiary applications
of videotape are extensive" and that the "prevailing trend of the decisions clearly
favors admissibility." Id.
o Videotapes of this kind are often used to clarify an expert witness's testimony
or to explain the functioning of a piece of machinery. See id. at 461; see also Brandt
v. French, 638 F.2d 209, 212 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that the lower court did not
err in allowing a film used to "show mechanical principles relative to... how a
motorcycle leans when it turns"); Young v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 618 F.2d 332,337-
38 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that lower court did not err in allowing a film of a test
depicting the physical possibility that a car could be diverted onto railroad tracks).
But see Swajian v. General Motors Corp., 916 F.2d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 1990) ("If a
videotaped test is insufficiently comparable to the circumstances in the case, the
videotape is inadmissible.").
"' This type of videotape could potentially be used at any trial to provide the jury
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accident victim, 42 to demonstrate a litigation theory,43 to record
depositions," and to reconstruct the occurrence of an accident.
45
with a view of a background area, method of operation, accident scene, or
environmental situation. See GREGORY P.JOSEPH, MODERN VISUAL EVIDENCE § 4.03
(1993); see also Petty v. Ideco, 761 F.2d 1146, 1151 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the
lower court did not err in allowing a videotape to illustrate the operation of an
allegedly defective well-servicing unit).
42 The "day-in-the-life" video is used to illustrate to the jury the impact that an
accident has had on the day-to-day functioning of the victim. See Bannister v. Town
of Noble, 812 F.2d 1265, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 1987) (adopting the factors enunciated
in Bolstridge v. Central Me. Power Co., 621 F. Supp. 1202 (D. Me. 1985), in judging
the admissibility of day-in-the-life videos and noting that the showing of the film is
within the discretion of the trial court); Bolstridge, 621 F. Supp. at 1203-04 (outlining
the court's concerns with the day-in-the-life video and excluding the video in this
particular instance); Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 610 (D.
Alaska 1977) (holding that a day-in-the-life video is admissible because it creates an
illustration of the injury that could not be duplicated by mere words).
This type of videotaped evidence has been the subject of much commentary. See
J. Ric Gass, DefendingAgainst Day in the Life Videos, in THE THIRD ANNUAL LITIGATION
MANAGEMENT SUPERCOURSE 1992, at 143, 146 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 432, 1992) (discussing potential objections, strategies, and
motions to counteract a plaintiff's use of the videos because they "will rivet the jury's
attention like no other evidence and bring home to the most hardened heart the
plight of a severely injured plaintiff"); Joseph M. Herlihy, Note, Beyond Words: The
Evidentiaty Status of "Day in the Life" Films, 66 B.U. L. REV. 133, 136 (1986) (arguing
that day-in-the-life films present a serious hearsay danger); Aida M. Alaka & Davidson
Ream, Day-in4he-Life Films: Moving Pictures That Move the Jury?, FOR THE DEF., Dec.
1991, at 20, 20 (addressing legal arguments to bring about the evidentiary exclusion
of the videos and noting that "[p]laintiffs have ... learned that films can present a
more persuasive picture of the nature and [extent] of a severe injury than other types
of evidence").
"s See Szeliga v. General Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 566, 567 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding
that the lower court did not err in admitting videotape to demonstrate the effect of
impact on a standard lug and nut arrangement of the axle mounting); Marks v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 562 F. Supp. 759, 766-67 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (admitting expert opinion and a
supporting videotaped reenactment of a tanker truck passing a Volkswagen to
illustrate the aerodynamic effect of a speeding truck), aff'd mem., 727 F.2d 1100 (3d
Cir. 1984).
"' The use of videotaped depositions has become fairly commonplace in civil trials.
See, e.g., Weiss v. Wayes, 132 F.R.D. 152, 154 (M.D. Pa. 1990) ("There is significant
authority outlining the advantages to the fact-finder in viewing a videotape deposition
rather than listening to the reading of a written transcript, usually by an attorney
simulating the testimony of the witness."); Rice's Toyota World v. Southeast Toyota
Distribs., Inc., 114 F.R.D. 647, 649 (M.D.N.C. 1987) ("A video depo-
sition ... permit[s] the fact-finder to utilize a greater portion of his perceptive
processes than when merely reading or listening to a stenographic deposition."). For
an extensive discussion of the use of videotaped depositions, seeJOSEPH, supra note
41, §§ 2.01-.06.45 SeeJOHN C. BUCHANAN ET AL., How TO USE VIDEO IN LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO
TECHNOLOGY, STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES 197 (1987) (noting that accident
reconstruction is used to "permit the court and jury to actually visualize what
happened to cause an accident" and to "reconstruct how the expert believes the
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Videotaped evidence has extensive applicability in criminal trials
as well, although frequently courts subject its use to an enhanced
standard of review. In criminal cases, "evidentiary concerns often
have constitutional impact, and courts generally tend to be more
strict in insuring accuracy, avoiding confusion, and requiring
advance disclosure of the evidence."46 Videotaped evidence has
been utilized to record police lineups,
47 criminal confessions,48
police surveillance work,49 arrests of drunk drivers,5" and crime
scene reenactments. 51  Thus, courts are well acquainted with
accident must have occurred"); Elizabeth A. Savage, Comment, Videotaped
Reenactments in Civil Trials: ProtectingProbativeEvidencefrom the TrialJudge's Unbridled
Discretion, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 433, 437-38 (1991) (arguing that as technology
advances, reevaluation of Rule 403 is necessary in order to bring about consistent
regulation of admission); see also Datskow v. Teledyne Continental Motors Aircraft
Prods., 826 F. Supp. 677, 685 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding no error in the admission of
a videotaped reenactment utilized to "'help thejury understand the expert's opinion
as to what happened,'" but cautioning the jury that the video was "'not meant to be
a re-creation of the accident'"). For a more complete discussion of this particular use
of videotape, see infra part II.A.
46Joseph, supra note 39, at 466.
47 See JOSEPH, supra note 41, § 5.06[1] (noting that "[v]ideotape recordings of
properly conducted lineups and resulting identifications are becoming extraordinarily
commonplace").
41 Videotaped confessions are frequently admitted into evidence and are often
considered a guarantee of "voluntariness" in making admissions. See Hendricks v.
Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that the lower court did not err
in admitting the videotaped confession because such a confession functions as a
"modern technique to protect a defendant's rights").
" Surveillance videos are utilized widely by law enforcement agencies to monitor
suspected criminal activity, and their admittance at trial has been accepted
extensively. This type of videotaped evidence gained public acclaim for its success
during the FBI sting operation known as Abscam, which targeted several U.S.
Congressmen. See, e.g., United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(holding that the FBI has no obligation to record conversations that will exculpate as
well as those that will inculpate); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 611 (2d
Cir.) (holding videotaped evidence of incriminating conversations admissible), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1983); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 859-60 (2d Cir.
1982) (holding that because the videotaping of defendant's conversations with
undercover agents did not violate the Fourth Amendment the videotapes were
admissible), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983); United States v. Murphy, 642 F.2d 699,
700 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding videotapes of acceptances of bribes admissible).
o The Supreme Court has accepted police use of videotape to record the physical
sobriety testing of motorists suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. See
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 604 (1990) (holding that a videotape of
defendant's sobriety tests is admissible to the extent that legitimate police procedures
were followed).
5' Crime scene reenactments are the focus of this Comment and will be discussed
in detail in later sections. See infra parts 11, III.E-F.
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evidence presented to the jury in the form of a video and the
concomitant problems 2 that accompany its use.53
C. Perceived Advantages of Demonstrative Evidence
Many commentators argue for increased use of demonstrative
and visual evidence by practitioners due to its ability to make an
impact on the trier of fact and "generate[] immediacy, credibility
and excitement."54 Those who support its extensive application
subscribe to the view that "it is easier and more effective to simply
showjurors what is being described, rather than waste time and risk
the confusion of jurors by relying solely on oral testimony."55 Yet,
as this Comment discusses later, the exact advantages that propo-
nents seek to gain from the presentation of videotaped crime scene
reenactments contribute to the creation of unfair prejudice against
criminal defendants.5"
-2 The use of videotaped evidence presents both logistical and evidentiary
problems. See Sharon Panian, Comment, Truth, Lies, and Videotape: Are Current
Federal Rules of Evidence Adequate?, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1199,1205-14 (1992) (describing
potential problems with the use of videotaped evidence, including possible editorial
manipulation, technical limitations, cost, and misuse of outtakes); Savage, supra note
45, at 435 ("Logistical problems that the videotaped reenactment and other forms of
videotaped demonstrative evidence present include the proper placement of
projection equipment, the necessity of standard interchangeable equipment, the cost
of installing standard equipment in all courtrooms, and the proper storage of
videotape as a court record in courthouses." (footnotes omitted)).
The scope of this Comment is confined to the evidentiary problems associated
with the use of videotaped reenactments of crime scenes. See infra part III. The use
of videotaped reenactments in criminal trials poses unique problems that, for the
most part, are not encountered through the use of other forms of video in civil and
criminal trials.
'3 The trial judge has broad latitude to admit videotaped evidence. Once
admitted, that decision will generally not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion
or some other similarly egregiousjudicial error can be shown. See e.g., Lies v. Farrell
Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 773 n.9 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The admissibility of demonstrative
evidence in particular is largely within the discretion of the trial judge.").
SGIVENS, supra note 28, § 1.01, at 3; see also JOSEPH, supra note 41, § 1.01
("Modern visual evidence, in its various forms, is a potentially powerful courtroom
stimulant for, and focus for the attention of, the finder of fact."); Thomas Brown,
Visual Evidence: Animations Add a New Dimension, NAT'L LJ., May 27, 1991, at 19, 19
("[A]ttorneys recognize that juries and even judges have become accustomed to
getting their information from media that are 'packaged' in more exciting, dramatic
ways.").
" Betsy Berman, Note, Have Juries Gone to the Movies?-The Use of Videotape in the
Courtroom, 12 AM.J. TRIAL ADVOC. 141, 142 (1988) (citing Marvin Belli, Demonstrative
Evidence: Seeing Is Believing, 1981 PERS. INJ. ANN. 858, 859).
' See infra part III.D.
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II. VIDEOTAPED REENACTMENTS AND FUTURISTIC TECHNOLOGY
A. Reenactments in Civil Trials
57
Although the judiciary has widely accepted videotaped evidence
in civil trials,5" courts frequently exercise closer scrutiny of video-
taped reenactments due to their recognized potential to cause
prejudice to the opposing party.5 9 In Datskow v. Teledyne Continen-
tal Motors Aircraft Products,60 the executrix of decedents' estates
sued the maker of the aircraft in which decedents were flying after
the aircraft caught fire and crashed, causing the death of all four
passengers. 61  The plaintiff commissioned the services of "a
mechanical engineer with a background in accident reconstruction"
to prove that a defect in the fuel system caused a leak, resulting in
the fire.62 The trial judge allowed the jury to view a "videotaped
computer-generated animation which illustrated [the expert's]
theory of where the fire began inside the engine and how it
spread." 6 In allowing the video, the court went to great lengths
to caution the jury that the video should only be used to assist in
comprehending the expert's opinion and should not be considered
a reenactment of the accident and the surrounding events.64
Although their testimony is subject to closer scrutiny, accident
reenactment experts are frequently commissioned for use in trials,
and their testimony can support a verdict.65 The court in Conti v.
- For an extensive discussion of the use of videotaped reenactments in civil trials,
see Savage, supra note 45, at 446-57.
' See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
59 See JOSEPH, supra note 41, § 4.05[11] ("[I]n contrast to the judicial reception
accorded other forms of videotape evidence there has been considerable judicial
reluctance to admit reconstruction tapes offered for the purpose of demonstrating
how an incident in issue occurred."); see also Randall v. Warnaco, Inc., 677 F.2d 1226,
1234 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that an attempt to duplicate the scene of a fire using
a similar tent and stove in order to demonstrate certain physical properties made the
"experimental evidence ... very close to a reenactment of the accident, and as such
its admission could be deemed unduly prejudicial").
60 826 F. Supp. 677 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
61 See id. at 681.
62 Id. at 6821
63 Id. at 685.
' See id. (citing the trial judge's cautionary instruction to the jury with approval
where the trial judge warned that the animation was "'not meant to be a re-creation
of the accident,' but [was] 'simply computer pictures to help you understand [the
expert's] opinion'").
6' See, e.g., Hinds v. General Motors Corp., 988 F.2d 1039, 1042 (10th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the lower court did not err in allowing the plaintiffs to utilize the
services of "an expert in accident reconstruction and occupant kinematics" who
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Ford Motor Co. 66 allowed the jury to view a filmed reenactment of
the start-up of the alleged injury-causing automobile.6 7 A husband
and wife sued Ford for injuries occurring when the husband-plaintiff
neglected to depress the clutch while starting their manual transmis-
sion automobile.6" The wife-plaintiff was injured when the car
lurched backward upon the turning of the ignition key.69
In finding no error in the admission of the reenactment on
motion for a new trial, the court noted that the video "was merely
helpful demonstrative evidence, and the differences between the re-
enactment and the actual accident were clearly and repeatedly
explained." 7' Thus, civil reenactments, though meriting closer
supervision than other forms of videotaped evidence, are generally
permitted upon satisfaction of certain fairness and accuracy
requirements.
Courts will not hesitate to exclude videotaped reenactments and
videos in general in civil trials when certain conditions are found,
or (as the case may be) are not found, to exist.71 Generally, the
tests performed in the reenactment must be similar to the situation
presented before the trier of fact.72 Furthermore, the tests in the
"testified to the manner in which the accident occurred and the movements of
[plaintiff's] body.., following [the] collision"); Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 981
F.2d 25, 28 (lst Cir. 1992) (holding that the lower court did not err in allowing
defendant's engineering expert to "utilize an x-ray of [plaintiff's] hand" to reconstruct
the cause of plaintiff's injury); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241,248 (2d
Cir. 1981) (holding that the lower court did not err in allowing plaintiff to
commission an accident reconstruction expert to testify "regarding the manner of
ejection [from the vehicle] and the kinematic effects of the accident sequence").
578 F. Supp. 1429 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
67 See id. at 1432 (holding that the lower court did not err "in permitting the jury
to view a filmed re-enactment of the start-up of the vehicle").
68 See id. at 1430.
69 See id.
70 Id. at 1432.
7' The exclusion of a videotaped reenactment generally occurs under the Rule 403
balancing test. The test dictates that evidence shall be excluded where prejudice to
the party is found to substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence
offered. See FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 is discussed extensively infra part III.
' See, e.g., Chase v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 19 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the lower court erred in allowing the jury to view video tests that were
so dissimilar to the conditions existing at the time of the accident "in such
fundamental and important respects that the risk of prejudice ... outweighed the
probative value of the evidence" (citing Gladhill v. General Motors Corp., 743 F.2d
1049, 1052 (4th Cir. 1984))); Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322,
1333 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that the "district court abused its discretion in
permitting the film to be shown when the conditions of the experiment were
admittedly substantially different from the conditions of the accident in this case");
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reenactment must also "fairly and accurately" represent the facts of
the case." The court may also choose to exclude the videotaped
evidence when its presentation can be considered cumulative or
duplicative in light of other available testimony. 4 The critical
evidentiary hurdle the reenactment must pass is that it must not
create unfair prejudice against the opposing party. 5 Thus, though
courts are amenable to the use of videotaped reenactments in civil
trials, they monitor their use closely. The enhanced scrutiny given
to reenactments in civil trials stands in sharp contrast to the laissez-
faire attitude generally taken by the courts with regard to other
forms of videotaped evidence.
76
This examination of the judicial treatment accorded videotaped
evidence in civil and criminal trials illustrates a continuum of
"decreasing" admissibility. When the videotaped evidence in a civil
trial can be regarded as attenuated or related to a collateral matter,
such as in the case of recorded depositions or the scenes of
accidents, the videotape's acceptance level can be considered
routine or high. But, as the content of the videotaped evidence
moves closer to dramatizing the issues in dispute (such as in the
case of reconstruction in civil cases), judicial scrutiny and instances
of exclusion increase. Thus, the recognition that courts will apply
a heightened standard of review to certain forms of videotaped
evidence in both civil and criminal settings serves as a harbinger of
Gladhill, 743 F.2d at 1051 (holding that the trial court erred in allowing a videotaped
demonstration where "the circumstances of the accident, as alleged, are so different
from this test as to make the results largely irrelevant if not misleading").
71 See, e.g., Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 378 (4th Cir. 1984) (allowing the jury
to view a video depicting the water pressure and hose nozzle used against the plaintiff
where "the videotape accurately and fairly depicted the force applied against
[plaintiff]" and posed no danger to the trial outcome).
' See, e.g., Thomas v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 465 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D.S.C. 1979)
(holding that the exclusion of a video depicting the burns of a severely injured
plaintiff was proper where "not only [would] the plaintiff be available to testify, but
the doctor, the wife, and the therapist" also would be available to testify to the extent
of the injuries).
' Unfair prejudice is the baseline against which all evidence must be measured.
Therefore, even if the evidence meets all other judicial requirements, it may still be
excluded under Rule 403. See infra part III (discussing Rule 403 and its role in the
overall scheme of the evidentiary code); see also Swajian v. General Motors Corp., 916
F.2d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that even if the circumstances in the reenactment
are sufficiently similar to the situation at bar, "their showing to thejury is still subject
to a Rule 403 analysis").
76 See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text (discussing the acceptance of
various forms of videotaped evidence in civil trials).
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the even closer judicial examination that courts confronting the
issue have given criminal reenactments. 7
B. Reenactments in Criminal Trials
1. The Effects of Technology-Predictions for the Future
The Mitchell and Spath rulings78 signified a substantial departure
from traditional judicial philosophy concerning reenactments in
light of advancing technology.79 Current computer and video
technology is approaching the point where the practitioner will be
able to create and reconfigure exhibits while in the courtroom.
80
" This closer scrutiny is commensurate with other protections that criminal
defendants receive over their civil counterparts, including the prohibition against
double jeopardy, see U.S. CONST. amend. V, cI. 2; the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, see id., amend. V, cl. 3; the right to confront witnesses, see id., amend. VI, cl. 2;
and the right to compulsory process of witnesses, see id., amend VI, ci. 3.
7 See supra notes 1-25 and accompanying text (discussing the Mitchell and Spath
trials).
9 SeeJeffrey Beer, 3-Dimensional Desktop Animation: Fake Reality Is Coming to a PC
Near You, CD-ROM PROF., Nov. 1992, at 33, 33-34 (describing latest developments in
three-dimensional modeling software programs and their application to the Mitchell
trial); Brown, supra note 54, at 19 ("Technology is changing the nature of the
evidence offered in American courtrooms"); Henke, supra note 20, at 434-36
(discussing the variables involved in producing computer-generated animated
reconstructions); Gregory P.Joseph, In Cour4 One Imaging System Is Worth a Thousand
Documents, N.Y. L.J., July 19, 1993, at S4 (describing uses of imaging systems
technology to ease the burden of handling papers, charts, and videotapes in the
courtroom); Richard Morochove, Design Your Own Office orRecreate a Murder with This
Firm's Software, TORONTO STAR, July 27, 1992, at C3 (discussing the commonly used
computer software that generated the animation used at the Mitchell trial); Howard
L. Nations & Douglas Filter, Computerized Graphics Find Larger Role, N.Y. L.J.,July 27,
1992, at S8 (surveying types of computer-generated evidence and restrictions courts
have placed on such evidence); Fred Setterberg, Roger Rabbit Goes to Court, CALIF.
LAW., Feb. 1990, at 70, 70 (describing various applications of computer graphics in
producing demonstrative evidence); Sherman, supra note 9, at 1 (referring to the use
of computer animation as "a technological revolution" in criminal trials); Marshall S.
Turner & Andrew T. Houghton, Interactive Animations are Wave of the Future, N.Y. LJ.,
Feb. 16, 1993, at S1 (heralding technological innovations allowing litigators to create
unlimited and immediately adaptable forms of animation evidence).
o See Turner & Houghton, supra note 79, at Si ("Interactive computer graphics
give the litigator an unlimited and immediately adaptable form of visual presentation.
They are flexible enough to be used not only during planned direct testimony, but
also during cross-examination, redirect, and opening and closing arguments.").
Over the course of the last decade, demonstrative evidence has "changed in kind,
not just in degree." Brain & Broderick, supra note 28, at 963.
With the advent of relatively low-cost but powerful computers and
sophisticated computer graphics software, demonstrative proof has changed
from the "state-of-the-art" brightly colored charts and nascent day-in-the-life
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Desktop computer software can now be utilized to create three-
dimensional graphics, as well as more basic charts, diagrams, and
crime scenes."1 As a result, "it is becoming increasingly possible
for home-based electronic[s] ... to create broadcast-quality
resolution images that rival the very best images seen on TV."1
2
For example, the reenactment prepared for the Mitchell trial was
created by an expert using a form of virtual reality.
8 3
Although technology has advanced to allow practitioners to
create their own demonstrative evidence, this technological leap
does not obviate the prejudice that occurs when the evidence is
viewed by the jury. 4 In fact, the technology may serve to enhance
the prejudice that occurs because the graphics may now be created
by practitioners who are attempting to obtain favorable judgments
for their clients in both civil and criminal courts. Noting the effects
of this technology, one practitioner commented that "'[t]he people
that are offering [the reenactment] into evidence are the same
people who produce it, direct it and star in it [and] they [then] get
on the stand and... critique it.'"8 5 Thus, as technology eases the
films of the early 1980's to professionally produced movies, imprinted on
laser discs, dramatically depicting, for example, an expert's opinion of what
the pilot saw from the cockpit during the last fifteen minutes before an
airplane crash, or the causes of a complicated accident at a hexane
production plant. Within the next decade or so, even these types of
demonstrative exhibits will seem tame, as then-state-of-the-art demonstrative
proof will be even more powerful. Technology will soon be available for a
witness to don a "body suit" in the courtroom, step into a three-dimensional
reconstruction of the scene, and illustrate exactly what she says occurred at
the relevant locale by interacting in real time with the objects on the screen.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
" Although the software is relatively expensive, new developments "represent[]
a gigantic leap forward in bringing broadcast-quality, high-powered rendering tools
to artists and other graphics professionals with limited resources." Beer, supra note
79, at 34. In addition, more basic software can provide "visual evidence solutions to
the perennial problem of explaining in court complex business, scientific, medical or
engineering concepts." Setterberg, supra note 79, at 70.
' Beer, supra note 79, at 34.
8 SeeJoan Hamilton, Is VR Real Enough for the Courtroom?, BUS. WK., Oct. 5, 1992,
at 99 (noting that the crime scene was re-created "on a personal computer using
computer-aided design software"). Virtual reality is a form of computer technology
that allows users to create realistic images in a variety of settings. See also Morochove,
supra note 79, at C3 (illustrating the effectiveness of the software used to re-create the
Mitchell crime scene and pointing out that the software enables the user to "zoom in
close for details, without waiting for the time-consuming process of a screen
regeneration to redraw the design").
See infra part III.D.
Sherman, supra note 9, at 32.
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burden and cost for practitioners to create videotaped reenact-
ments, the more likely it becomes that such evidence will be utilized
in the courtroom.
The following Section details the treatment that the videotaped
reenactment has been accorded in various state appellate courts
prior to the rulings in Mitchell and Spath.86
2. A Look Back to Lopez v. State8 7 -The Mule
Robert Lopez got caught. Lopez was arrested as part of a
standard drug sting-a "buy and bust" operation conducted by the
Fort Worth, Texas, police department.8 8 An undercover officer set
up a drug buy at a local motel where Lopez, assisting two accompli-
ces, was caught driving the backup car during the attempted
transaction." As part of its trial presentation, the prosecution
prepared a videotaped reenactment to assist the jury in visualizing
the scene at the motel.9" Created through the recollections of the
officers at the scene and "consist[ing] of individuals dressed in
casual wear driving cars around a motel parking lot,"91 the reenact-
ment totaled "2 to 3 minutes in length and was stopped at various
points to allow police officer witnesses to narrate the event
shown."9 2 The reenactment was fairly primitive in light of today's
technology: "black and white, shot at a distance and silent.""8
The trial judge allowed the reenactment to be viewed over the
defendant's objection, and Lopez was eventually convicted by the
jury.9 4 Lopez appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the use of the
videotaped reenactment was reversible error.95 The Texas Court
" This Section will focus on state court rulings concerning the admission of crime
scene reenactments. Although the focus of this Comment is the admissibility of
reenactments under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the rules reach a majority of the
states. See infra part III.A. Federal courts have yet to rule on the admissibility of
videotaped crime scene reenactments.
87 651 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
88 See id. at 413.
89 See id.
90 See id.
9' Id. at 414.
92 Id.
9sId. The reenactment used in the Mitchell trial, on the other hand, depicted
colored graphics, moving forms, and changing angles. See Curtis, supra note 4, at Al,
A6; see also infra part II.B.4.a.
9 Lopez was convicted of aggravated delivery of marijuana and sentenced by the
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of Appeals agreed, holding that "any staged, re-enacted criminal acts
or defensive issues involving human beings are impossible to
duplicate in every minute detail and are therefore inherently
dangerous, offer little in substance and the impact of re-enactments
is too highly prejudicial to insure the State or the defendant a fair
trial."9" Although the court did not articulate a specific evidentiary
criteria or standard for review,"' after a thoughtful analysis the
court found the reenactment to be "prejudicial."9 8
The court rejected the prosecution's contention that the
reenactment was nothing more than "a series of posed pictures" and
instead expressed concern over potential dangers inherent in the
admission of the reenactment.9 The court first noted the general
effect of videotaped evidence on a jury and the forceful mental
impression it creates. 0 0 The court then articulated the negative
effects videotaped evidence imposes on the perceptions of individu-
al jurors, possibly outweighing the force of other evidence. 10 1 The
court's concern was that "[t]he general appearance of an actor, his
facial expression or slightest gesture whether intended or not may
sway a juror who has listened to lengthy testimony." 0 2 Troubled
by the potential impact of videotaped reenactments on the cognitive
sensibilities of the jury,0 3 the Texas Court of Appeals precluded
their use in evidence in subsequent trials.'0
' Id. at 416. Thus, the Court of Appeals, in reversing the conviction, created a
broad-based judicial ban on videotaped reenactments.
97 Texas is one of the many states that has enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence
in its entirety. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. Thus, the logical
assumption may be that the decision was made under Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of
Criminal Evidence, a provision identical to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Compare TEX. R. CRIM. EviD. 403 with FED. R. EVID. 403. See infra notes 209-38 and
accompanying text (discussing Federal Rule 403).
" Lopez, 651 S.W.2d at 416.
99 Id. at 414.
100 The court argued that "'[a] motion picture of the artificial recreation of an
event may unduly accentuate certain phases of the happening, and because of the
forceful impression made upon the minds of the jurors by this kind of evidence, it
should be received with caution.'" Id. (quoting People v. Daab, 197 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal.
1948)). The impact on the jury noted by the Daab court and the Lopez court forms
the crux of the argument to exclude videotaped reenactments from criminal trials.
See infra part III.D.
101 See Lopez, 651 S.W.2d at 415. Furthermore, the court believed that the "danger
of jurors branded with television images of actors, not testimony, is too great to
ascertain." Id.
102 Id.
'0 The court also expressed concern that prosecutors and defendants would
compete for jury attention by creating "dueling" videos. See id.
' Id. at 416. In formulating its decision, the court looked to the Supreme Court
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3. Post-Lopez Treatment
Lopez v. State is the most searching and thorough judicial analysis
of the admissibility of a videotaped reenactment. Several other
courts have reached similar conclusions without conducting an in-
depth examination of potential prejudice to the defendant. This
Section's purpose is to track the reasoning of those courts to create
a typology for the exclusion of reenactments at criminal trials.
a. State v. Hopperstadl°-The Disorderly
The details of John Hopperstad's arrest were sparse.
10 6
Following Hopperstad's arrest for disorderly conduct,117 the
prosecution, over defendant's objection, presented to the jury a
videotaped reenactment of the events surrounding Hopperstad's
arrest.08 Following his conviction, Hopperstad argued, as Lopez
did, that showing the jury the reenactment was reversible error.
10 9
The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed, citing two distinct
grounds for excluding the reenactment. First, the court found that
the reenactment was not probative of any material facts in dispute,
concluding that "[a] dramatization of one side's account of what
happened.., does not 'tend to prove or disprove a material fact in
issue.'" " ' In reaching this conclusion, the court simply stated that
of Wyoming's decision in Peterson v. State, 586 P.2d 144 (Wyo. 1978), for guidance.
See Lopez, 651 S.W.2d at 415. In Peterson, the court held that no error was committed
in excluding a videotaped reenactment presented by the defendant. See Peterson, 586
P.2d at 154. The defendant attempted to reenact the circumstances leading to his
arrest by consuming substantial quantities of alcohol to record his responses. See id.
The court, using a formulation identical to Federal Rule 403 (at that time, not yet
enacted in Wyoming), found that the exclusion was within the discretion of the trial
judge and was proper since the circumstances surrounding the reenactment were
substantially different from the actual events. See id.
105 367 N.W.2d 546 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
"0 The court simply notes that he was arrested for "disorderly conduct following
a scuffle at the Law Enforcement Center in Austin[, Minnesota]." Id. at 547.
Presumably, Hopperstad was involved in some form of disturbance outside the police
station.
107 It is interesting to note that the prosecution expended time and expense in
creating a videotaped reenactment for Hopperstad's trial even though a disorderly
conduct charge in Minnesota is only a misdemeanor. See id. at 547-48 (citing AUSTIN,
MINN., ORDINANCES § 10.06(3)).
1"8 See id. The reenactment was created as part of the internal police investigation
file. See id.109 See id. at 549.11' Id. (quoting MINN. R. EvID. 401). The court, utilizing an evidence code
identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence, cited to Rules 401 and 402 of the
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"we doubt the relevance of the videotaped reenactment of the
incident that led to the defendant's arrest."11 1
In addition to finding the videotape lacked probative value, the
Hopperstad court found the reenactment to be prejudicial because
its presentation could potentially impact the jury in a manner
disproportionate to its evidentiary value. 12 Arguing that the
videotaped reenactment violated "basic fairness," the court, utilizing
reasoning paralleling Lopez, concluded that "[s]eeing the events
depicted exactly as the State's witnesses said they happened is
bound to affect the jury out of all proportion to its value as
evidence.""' Following this cursory analysis, the court reversed
Hopperstad's conviction and remanded for a new trial.
11 4
b. State v. Trahan1 5-The Murderer
Ty Trahan's case could be described as a typical lover's quarrel,
except for its tragic ending. 116  Trahan was arrested for the
murder of his ex-girlfriend.1 7 Witnesses testified that Trahan and
the victim had argued repeatedly throughout the night over the




Trahan testified that he had been drinking continuously for
approximately twelve hours prior to the murder."
9
From the prosecution's point of view, the state possessed a solid
case against Trahan: a motive, the murder weapon, and extremely
Minnesota Rules of Evidence in reaching its conclusion. See MINN. R. EvID. 401,402.
Essentially, the court resorted to its judicial instincts to find the reenactment not
relevant. See infra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Rules 401 and
402).
"' Hopperstad, 367 N.W.2d at 549.
112 The court looked to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403, a rule identical to its
federal counterpart, and found the reenactment to be prejudicial as well as irrelevant.
See id. The court also cited further concern for the videotape's probative value: it
argued that the reenactment was "cumulative" and that it "only restated graphically
the testimony of the State's preceding three witnesses." Id.
'is Id.
114 See id.
n' 543 So. 2d 984 (La. Ct. App. 1989), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Simpson, 551 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (La. 1989), but affd, 576 So. 2d 1 (La. 1990).
Although this case deals with a defendant's attempt to have a videotaped crime scene
reenactment viewed by the jury, it raises similar concerns as prosecution attempts to
present a reenactment.
"' The defendant and the victim had been dating during the six weeks leading up
to the murder. See id. at 988.
117 See id. at 989.
"s See id. at 988.119 See id. at 989.
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favorable forensic evidence. 120  To counteract the weight of the
evidence, the defendant and his experts created a videotaped
reenactment of their account of the fatal encounter and attempted
to have it shown to the jury.121 After screening the reenactment,
the trial judge excluded the evidence, finding that "the reconstruc-
tion did not accurately depict the condition or the position of the
parties." 2 2 Trahan was convicted of second-degree murder.
2
1
Upon review, the Louisiana Court of Appeal upheld the trial
court's decision to exclude the reenactment, citing the reconstruc-
tion's lack of probative value and hinting at the potential prejudice
the reenactment could cause.1 24 The court found that the factual
inaccuracies cited by the trial judge vitiated the reenactment's
probative value and that "[t]he reconstruction was, therefore,
inconclusive in relation to its ability to corroborate defendant's
story." 25 In addition, the court found that the reenactment would
affect judicial economy by implicating collateral issues, serving only
to repeat testimony and confuse the jury.126 In all likelihood, the
court noted its concerns about judicial economy and accuracy to
allude to the potential prejudice the reenactment could engender.
In this case, however, the defendant, not the prosecution, made the
presentation. As such, the concerns of potential prejudice that Rule
403 attempts to counter are not nearly as prevalent.
120 See id. at 988-89.
M Trahan argued that the videotaped reenactment "corroborated [his] version of
the incident and rebutted the opinion of the state expert who had earlier testified
that [his] version [of the events] was impossible." Id. at 996.
' 22 Id. at 997.
123 Trahan was sentenced to life in prison without parole, probation, or suspension
of sentence. See id. at 987.
124 See id. at 997. Louisiana has adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, so
presumably the court made its decision based upon Rule 403 of the Louisiana Rules
of Evidence, although it makes no mention of the rule in its decision. See LA. CODE
EVID. ANN., art. 403 (West 1994). For a discussion of Federal Rule 403, see infra part
IIr.C.
125 Trahan, 543 So. 2d at 997. The court further stated that the "significant
inaccuracy in the placement of the victim during the reconstruction practically
eliminated the probative value of the videotape." Id.
126 The court stated that
the reconstruction presented a potential that collateral issues would be
raised which would be unduly time consuming and confusing to the jury.
Defendant testified fully as to his version of the incident. Defense counsel
fully cross-examined the state's expert and in fact elicited the contested
testimony of whether certain physical maneuvers were possible.
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c. State v. Caudil12 7--The Intruder
Like Ty Trahan, Gordon Caudill let the emotions of personal
life get the better of him. Caudill was arrested at the scene of the
shooting of his former employer and charged with several-
crimes.128 Not only did Caudill have "a previous employer/
employee relationship" with the victim, but he had a "romantic
relationship" with her as well.1 9 Upon the termination of their
romantic relationship, Caudill broke into the victim's house and
shot her twice.' Caudill did not dispute that he actually per-
formed the physical acts constituting the crimes, but contested all
the charges on the grounds that he was unable to form the requisite
criminal intent because of insanity. 3 1
Although the facts of the incident were uncontroverted, the trial
judge allowed the prosecution to present a videotaped reenactment
of the incident over the defendant's objection. 3 2 The reenact-
ment was prepared by the Sheriffs Department a short time after
the incident; the victim played herself, and a deputy sheriff played
the part of the defendant."3 ' The videotape "depictred] a deputy
sheriff looking through [the victim's] window as she stood in the
kitchen."3 4 The scene then shifted to the deputy "stepp[ing] in
and out of the doorway to the bedroom, acting as if he was firing a
gun by pointing his finger at her, and then coming into the
bedroom, acting as if he was continuing to fire a gun at her."
13 5
Following his conviction, Caudill appealed, challenging the showing
of the reenactment.
The Missouri Court of Appeals found itself presented with a
novel issue of evidentiary law, but did not undertake an indepen-
127 789 S.W.2d 213 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
121 Caudill was charged with assault, armed criminal action, burglary, and the
unlawful use of a weapon. See id. at 214.
12 Id.
"' See id. The facts of the case were undisputed. Caudill fired one shot at the
victim through her kitchen window, striking her in the arm. See id. He then
subsequently broke into the house and followed the victim into her bedroom, where
he fired two more shots, one of which struck the victim in the leg. See id. At this
point, Caudill exhausted his supply of bullets and the victim retrieved her own
shotgun, firing one shot, which struck Caudill in the abdomen. See id.
3 See id. ("At trial [Caudill] relied on a defense of not guilty by reason of mental
disease or defect.").
132 See id. at 215.
1s3 See id.
134 Id. at 216.
15 Id.
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dent analysis of the merits of the reenactment. 136  Instead, the
court considered the merits of numerous other state court deci-
sions,13 7 eventually deferring to the logic of Lopez v. State."'8 In
accepting the logic of Lopez, the court cited concerns for the
difficulty in re-creating human events, the appearance of the
participants in the reenactment, and the powerful effects of
television.' Although finding that the use of the videotaped
reenactment was error,14° the court nevertheless concluded that
the error was harmless14 ' and affirmed the verdict. In arriving at
its broad-based exclusion of reenactments, the court failed to
conduct an independent evidentiary analysis and merely adopted a
prior court's analysis.
4. Mitchell and Spath'---The Judicial Philosophy Shifts
a. People v. Mitchell'--The Porn Czar
During Jim Mitchell's trial for the murder of his brother, 144 the
prosecution did not present or possess any eyewitnesses to buttress
its theory of the case. 145  Therefore, the state commissioned an
expert to create a computerized videotaped reenactment utilizing
" See id. ("No such Missouri case [concerning the admissibility of a videotape
reenactment of a crime] has been found. Other jurisdictions, however, have had
occasion, in criminal cases, to address the admissibility of videotape evidence which
goes beyond merely recording the scene of a crime.").
137 See id. (noting State v. Hopperstad and State v. Trahan). For a discussion of
the Hopperstad and Trahan cases see supra parts II.B.3.a-b.
'" See id. ("The most convincing case dealing with the admissibility of a videotape
reenactment of a crime... is from the Texas Court of Appeals.").
1"9 See id. For a discussion of Lopez, see supra part II.B.2.
140 See id. ("A videotape reenactment of a crime ... where the victim reenacts the
crime with a third party playing the role of the defendant, should be and is hereby
declared inadmissible in Missouri.").
141 See id. at 217 ("In the case at bar there is no reasonable doubt that [defendant]
would have been found guilty as charged without the admission of... the videotape
reenactment.").
142 It is noteworthy that Jim Mitchell and Gary Spath share much in common in
the context of the legal issues both faced. Outside of their similar legal contexts,
however, they could not be more different. Mitchell, the controller of a far-reaching
pornographic empire, constantly under legal scrutiny, stands in contrast to Spath, the
young police officer attempting to maintain order in an urban environment.
' No. 12462 (Cal. Super. Ct. Marin County indictment filed Sept. 17, 1991).
144 For the details surrounding Mitchell's arrest, see supra notes 1-6 and
accompanying text.
145 See Abrams, supra note 1, at E18 ("No one saw the killing, although Artie's live-
in girlfriend ... testified that she was in the house.").
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forensic evidence and the prosecution's theory of the case to
demonstrate the purported movements of the defendant throughout
the victim's house.1 46 The prosecution created the reenactment
to illustrate that the events of the evening were precipitated by the
defendant, not by the victim.
1 47
Despite its initial exclusion, 148 the trial judge subsequently
permitted a modified version of the reenactment to be shown to the
jury at trial.1 49 The reenactment allowed the jury to view "colored
lines representing different areas of the... house where Artie was
shot, an outline of a moving human form that was supposed to be
the victim and swift-moving red lines that represented gunfire
during the shooting."150 In addition, the reenactment could be
altered to show various images and "[t]he images c[ould] be
changed to depict the scene from different angles, including
overhead views."' Mitchell was convicted,'5 2 and he is currently
appealing the verdict, relying in significant part on the use of the
reenactment during the trial. 5
b. New Jersey v. Spath5 4-The Cop
Unlike the prosecution in Jim Mitchell's trial, prosecutors at
Gary Spath's manslaughter trial had the benefit of several eyewit-
nesses. 55 Regardless, the key issue in the case turned on whether
the jury believed the prosecution's argument that Spath fired while
the victim had his back turned, or the defense's argument that the
victim was turning toward Spath when the officer fired.
56
" For a description of the technology used in the Mitchell reenactment, see supra
part II.B.1.
1
4 7 See Sherman, supra note 9, at 32 (noting that the reenactment was "designed
to demonstrate the prosecution's contention that the victim's position and the timing
proved the killing was a deliberate, premeditated act").
148 The trial judge would not allow the video reenactment to be shown until
"prejudicial' assumptions that were not backed up by the evidence" were removed.
Curtis, supra note 4, at A6.
149 See id. at Al.
150Id.
151 Id.
2 Mitchell was sentenced to six years in prison and fined ten thousand dollars.
See id.
" See id. ("[Mitchell's attorney] planned to attack as improper the prosecutor's
use of a computerized video re-enactment of the crime .... ").
No. SGJ263908 (NJ. Super. Ct. Crim. Div. filed Dec. 5, 1990).
For a description of the fatal encounter, see supra notes 7-14 and accompanying
text.1 See supra notes 14, 17 and accompanying text.
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To assist in articulating their version of the events, the prosecu-
tion commissioned the creation of a reenactment to demonstrate
that the victim had his hands in the air when he was shot and to
show the trajectory of the bullet on entry into his body.'57 Fur-
thermore, the video contained an "additional, emotionally charged
scene... [depicting a] young, black male model running into a
parking lot and spinning toward the camera with his arms held
high." 5' The trial judge allowed the reenactment to be presented
to the jury,'59 although the prosecution eventually decided not to
make use of it for strategic reasons. 6 ' Spath was ultimately
acquitted of any wrongdoing by the jury.
1 61
5. Analysis
Prior to Spath and Mitchell, the majority of state appellate courts
analyzing the use of videotaped reenactments in criminal trials
favored their exclusion.'62 The various courts addressing the issue
have cited numerous factors in support of this proposition; the con-
sensus, however, has articulated two dominant forms of prejudice
impacting on the defendant's ability to receive a fair trial when a
videotaped reenactment is utilized.
1
57 See Henneberger, supra note 8, at 21 ("The state's case centers on a videotaped
re-enactment of the shooting that shows that the bullet hole in [the victim's] parka
lined up with the entry wound in the victim's back only when one or both of the
models' arms are raised.").
158 Sherman, supra note 9, at 32.
' See Melinda Henneberger, Judge OKs Simulated Shooting, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 15,
1992, at 19; see also Sherman, supra note 9, at 22 (quoting presidingJudge DiGisi in
a subsequent interview as saying that he "thought in this particular case it would be
invaluable to understand what the expert was testifying to").
"58 See Melinda Henneberger, ShootingExpert Grilled, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 28,1992,
at 24.
161 See Sherman, supra note 9, at 32.
162 See supra parts II.B.2-3. But see Lee v. State, 760 P.2d 1039, 1044 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that the trial court did not err in admitting a videotape in which
the victim reenacted her actions prior to being hit by defendant's car because thejury
was made aware of the "various dissimilarities between the conditions in the video
and the conditions at the time of the offense"); State v. Billings, 409 S.E.2d 707, 713
(N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the trial judge's decision not to exclude a
videotaped reenactment was not error as the video only illustrated an earlier
confrontation between the defendant and the victim, and the tapes "did not depict
any conduct, incriminating or otherwise, of the defendant"),
In both Lee and Billings, the reenactments viewed by the jury did not attempt to
illustrate any culpable conduct committed by the defendant. Thus, the potential for
prejudicial harm engendered by the reenactments that were eventually excluded in
situations such as Lopez did not exist in either of these two cases.
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First, reviewing courts have articulated a concern for the
potential impact that viewing the defendant, or a likeness of the
defendant, committing the crime on videotape will have on the
decision-making capabilities of the jury. 6 ' Three of the four
decisions analyzed-Lopez, Hopperstad, and Caudill-have considered
this the primary reason for exclusion."6  The Lopez court ex-
pressed its concern: "The danger of jurors branded with television
images of actors, not testimony, is too great to ascertain. No court
instruction could remove highly prejudicial evidence of a re-enacted
rape or murder if we establish this precedent."'6 5 Because this
impact is the primary concern of courts excluding such evidence,
this Comment focuses on the impact of the reenactment on the
cognitive processes ofjuries and the potential for error it generates
in the decision-making process.
166
Second, reviewing courts have also relied on the impact of video-
taped reenactments on judicial economy and the fact-finding
process as an exclusionary vehicle. 167  The courts in Hopperstad
and Trahan reasoned that presentation of reenactments at trial
would be both repetitive and confusing.' 6 This argument is
predicated on the notion that a reenactment is only a visualization
of prior oral testimony and that oral testimony can adequately
illustrate the circumstances of the criminal activity.169  Although
162 See Lopez v. State, 651 S.W.2d 413, 414-15 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that
subtle gestures, facial expressions, or appearances may improperly sway juries); see
also State v. Hopperstad, 367 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that
a videotaped reenactment did not "'tend to prove or disprove a material fact in
issue'" and, even if the reenactment were relevant, it was cumulative and prejudicial);
State v. Caudill, 789 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Lopez); supra notes
87-114 and 127-41 and accompanying text (discussingLopez, Hopperstad, and Caudill).
164 See Lopez, 651 S.W.2d at 415; see also Hopperstad, 367 N.W.2d at 549 ("Seeing
the events depicted exactly as the State's witnesses said they happened is bound to
affect the jury out of all proportion to its value as evidence."); Caudill, 789 S.W.2d at
216 (citing Lopez).
in Lopez, 651 S.W.2d at 415.
'6 See infra part III.D.
167 See State v. Trahan, 543 So. 2d 984, 997 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (fearing that
collateral issues may be raised by inaccurate videotape reconstruction, unduly taking
court time and confusing the jury), overruled on other grounds by State v. Simpson, 551
So. 2d 1303, 1304 (La. 1989), but aff'd, 576 So. 2d 1 (La. 1990); Hopperstad, 367
N.W.2d at 549 (finding the videotape to present only "cumulative" evidence).
"6 See supra notes 111, 126 and accompanying text.
169 This argument does not carry the same logical strength as does the argument
that the "viewing" of video in general prejudices criminal defendants. According to
the "unnecessary visualization" critics, any form of demonstrative evidence that is not
"real," whether it is a video, map, chart, or graph, is repetitive. Courts routinely allow
the use of most forms of demonstrative evidence, however, regardless of their
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this determination runs counter to the present status of demonstra-
tive evidence in the courts, the conclusion is in part a reference to
the potential prejudice argument. 17' Essentially, courts citing
repetition and confusion do so for reasons ofjudicial caution. It is
logical to reason that if other adequate means of articulating the
aspects illustrated by the reenactment exist, there is no need to risk
the potential prejudice that the reenactment may engender. Thus,
prior to Mitchell and Spath,17 1 the exclusion of videotaped reenact-
ments was, for the most part, the rule and not the exception.
In Mitchell and Spath, however, although the reenactments were
of the same character as those used in the exclusionary cases,
172
the courts permitted the jury to view them. 173 The next Part of
this Comment will argue that with regard to the admission of
videotaped reenactments in criminal trials, this change is not
necessarily for the better. The logic originally outlined by the Lopez
court withstands psychological scrutiny and should be followed as
a basis for the continued exclusion of reenactments in criminal
trials. The next Part of this Comment will present the basis for
excluding prejudicial evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
III. THE EVIDENTIARY BACKGROUND-RULE 403 AND "UNFAIR
PREJUDICE"
There are numerous ways in which videotaped presentations
may be admitted into evidence or presented to a jury, and numer-
ous evidentiary hurdles that videotaped evidence must clear before
the court will accept its use. The reenactment may, for example,
repetitive nature. See supra parts I.A-B. Yet, when considered with the prejudice
argument in mind, the "unnecessary visualization" argument seems to be another
method that accomplishes the same result.
70 The Trahan court also cites inaccuracy as reason for exclusion. See Trahan, 543
So. 2d at 997. Although this is a common ground for exclusion of any evidence, and
particularly for videotaped evidence, see supra note 73 and accompanying text, this
Comment does not address this contention.
171 See supra part II.B.4.
" Seesupra part II.B.2-3. Although the videotaped reenactment shown in Mitchell
was first prepared on computer and then shown on video, it was arguably more
prejudicial than the reenactments discussed in Part II.B. In the exclusionary cases,
the reenactments were created in part through the testimony of those who actually
were involved in or witnessed the event. In Mitchell, the reenactment was purely
speculative, constructed using only the prosecution's version of the facts based on
forensic evidence gathered at the scene. The Spath video more closely mirrors
traditional reenactments excluded by courts, as it was generated based in part on the
testimony of eyewitnesses and forensic evidence.
'73 See supra text accompanying notes 23, 148-50, 159.
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require authentication under Rule 901,174 may be objected to on
hearsay grounds according to Rule 801,175 or may be introduced
to support the testimony of an expert as allowed by Rule 703.176
Furthermore, the reenactment must be logically and legally relevant
to the issues in dispute. 177 For purposes of this analysis, it will be
assumed that the videotaped reenactment will succeed in satisfying
all conditions precedent to an analysis under Federal Rule 403171
and its analogous state counterparts.
179
The balancing test of Rule 403180 is considered the "corner-
stone" 18 1 of the Federal Rules, and most evidence that is otherwise
"7 Rule 901(a) provides that "[t]he requirement of authentication or identification
as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." FED. R. EVID.
901(a).
"" The Federal Rules define hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c). A statement is defined as "(1) an
oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the
person as an assertion." FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
176 Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2786, 2796-98 (1993) (rejecting the "general acceptance" test announced in Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), as superseded by the Federal Rules,
which involves a relevance and reliability assessment by the trial judge). For a
discussion of the standard that expert testimony must satisfy under the Federal Rules,
see Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Frye, Daubert, and the Federal Rules, 29 CRIM.
L. BULL. 428, 430-35 (1993).
1'7 Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as that which "ha[s] any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID.
401. Pursuant to Rule 402, "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible .... Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EVID. 402.
"8 Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
' ' See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
180 The balancing test, as it is commonly known, involves weighing probative value
against the danger of unfair prejudice and other judicial evils.
181 Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of
Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REv. 497, 497 (1983) (citing Herbert
Peterfreund, Relevance and Its Limits in the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Courts: Article IV, 25 REC. A.B. CrrY N.Y. 80, 83 (1970)); see also Jon R.
Waltz,Judicial Discretion in theAdmission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
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admissible may be analyzed and excluded under its aegis. 182 One
commentator has noted that "[w]ith few exceptions, Rule 403 grants
to the trial court the power to exclude evidence that other rules
clearly suggest is admissible.""8 ' Despite the importance of the
rule, courts and commentators have struggled to form a workable
definition of "unfair prejudice" that provides the trial judge with a
quantifiable guideline according to which the Rule 403 balancing
test may be performed.8 4
A. The Breadth of the Federal Rules
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence by Congress in
197585 has had a profound and broad-based impact upon the
development of the "law" of evidence. Not only do the rules govern
the administration of all civil and criminal trials in federal jurisdic-
tions,'86 but thirty-five states have enacted or promulgated evi-
dence codes fashioned after the Federal Rules as well. 8 7 In those
79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097, 1110 (1985) ("Rule 403 [is] one of the most, if not the most
important of the Federal Rules of Evidence .... ").
182 See Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
74 IOWA L. REV. 413, 441 (1989); see also 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM,JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5213, at 262-63 (1978) (pointing
out that Rule 403 was intended to make every rule of admissibility subject to the
power of discretionary exclusion); D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional
Challenge to the Treatment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L.
REV. 289, 291 (1989) ("In recognition that the admission of relevant evidence may
threaten the reliability of the factfinding process, Rule 403 provides a balancing test
by which probative, otherwise admissible evidence may be excluded.").
Mengler argues that "by making most other admissibility rules subordinate to
Rule 403, the drafters gave tremendous discretion to the trial court to exclude
relevant evidence." Mengler, supra, at 442. But see I JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET
A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 403[01], at 403-6 (noting that although courts
have extensive power to exclude under Rule 403, trial courts lack the discretion to
exclude evidence provided for in Rule 609(a)(2), allowing the admission of evidence
of prior crimes or false statements to be used for impeachment purposes).
s Mengler, supra note 182, at 441.
's See infra part III.C.
's' Pub. L. No. 93-595,88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. app.
at 733 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
'm See FED. R. EVID. 101.
117 See, e.g., ALASKA R. EVID. 101-1103; 17A ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules 101-1103
(1977 & Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (1987); 7B COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
ch. 33 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17 (1980 & Supp. 1992); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 90.101-.958 (West 1979 & Supp. 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 626-
1 (1980 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO R. EVID. 101-1103; IOwA R. EvID. 101-1103; KY. R.
EVID. 101-1104; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. arts. 101-1103 (West 1994); ME. R. EVID. 101-
1102; MICH. R. EVID. 101-1102; 50 MINN. STAT. ANN. Rules 101-1101 (1980 & Supp.
1994); Miss R. EVID. 101-1103; MONT. CODE ANN. § 26, ch. 10, arts. I-X (1993); NEB.
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states that do not have evidentiary codes based upon the federal
system, some have individual provisions that mirror the Federal
Rules."s s In addition, within some of the states not currently
adhering to the Federal Rules, there is a strong groundswell of
support for their enactment. 89 Thus, any interpretation based on
the Federal Rules will have far-reaching implications for the legal
community. 9°
B. The Philosophy of the Federal Rules
The Federal Rules, according to one commentator, "have
brought about a quiet revolution" in the development of the law of
evidence.' 91  "[D]iscretion, creativity, and admissibility"-these
adjectives are now the hallmarks against which evidentiary questions
should be measured. 2 Flexibility must be built into the Federal
REV. STAT. §§ 27-101 to 27-1103 (1989 & Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 47.020-56.020 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1994); N.H. R. EVID. 100-1103; N.M. STAT.
ANN. (Judicial Pamphlet) § 11-101 to 11-1102 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ch. 8C-1, Rules 101-1102 (1983 & Supp. 1993); N.D. R. EVID. 101-1103; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. tit. 23 (Anderson 1991 & Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 2101-3009 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40.010-.585
(Butterworth 1988 & Supp. 1992); R.I. R. EVID. 100-1008; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 19-1-1 to 19-18-8 (1987 & Supp. 1993); TENN. R. EVID. 101-1108; TEX. R. CRIM.
EVID. 101-1101; UTAH R. EVID. 101-1103; VT. R. EVID. 101-1103; Washington Court
Rules Annotated, Rules 101-1103 (1982 & Supp. 1993); W. VA. R. EvID. 101-1102;
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 901.01-911.02 (West 1993); WY. R. EvID. 101-1104.
"s See. e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966 & Supp. 1994) (providingjudicial
discretion to exclude prejudicial evidence, mirroring Federal Rule 403).
..9 See David M. Chuprinsky, Uniform State Code of Evidence in the Works, PA. L.J.,
May 3, 1993, at 3 (noting that a current proposal in the Pennsylvania State Senate will
"create[] a Pennsylvania Code of Evidence... based in large part on the Federal
Rules of Evidence"); James Hely, Why N.J. Should Adopt Federal Rules of Evidence, 130
N.J. L.J. 99, 99, 111 (1992) (arguing that the adoption of an evidence code based
upon the federal rules will "providejudges with helpful interpretations from around
the country" in order to "foster the resolution of cases by attenuating the hit and miss
nature of trial and by encouraging settlement discussions").
190 In fact, decisions under the Federal Rules may have implications in non-Federal
Rulesjurisdictions. See JOSEPH, supra note 41, § 1.02 ("Even in states without codifica-
tion, the courts frequently look to the Federal Rules for guidance, occasionally going
so far as to adopt particular rules as a matter of decisional law." (footnotes omitted)).
. Faust F. Rossi, The Silent Revolution, Lrric., Winter 1983, at 13, 13.
"' Id. Rossi makes this argument by examining the content of the Rules them-
selves and finding extensive use of discretionary language. Rossi cites, among many,
Rules 403 and 609, which provide for the trialjudge to weigh the harm of potential
evidence against its benefit, as well as Rules 701 and 702, which allowjudges to admit
expert testimony if they find it "helpful." See id.; see also Gold, supra note 181, at 497
("Modern evidence law favors admissibility. The Federal Rules of Evidence, for
example, eliminate many old exclusionary doctrines while creating an expansive
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Rules to achieve its mandate, which is the "promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth
may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." 9 ' Judicial
discretion exists in many forms throughout the course of the
Rules,19 4 and its value is underscored by the deferential treatment
that evidentiary rulings receive upon appellate review.
19 5
definition of relevancy." (footnotes omitted)).
'9 FED. R. EVID. 102.: Mengler points out several reasons for the flexibility that
is granted to the trialjudge under the Rules. See Mengler, supra note 182, at 414-15.
Mengler first notes that evidence law "must be simple and accessible," as trialjudges
are required to make quick, yet often difficult, decisions. Id. at 414. Next, Mengler
points out that every trial is an individual event, each one different from the next,
and that "the traditional rules of evidence are imperfect tools in getting at the truth
of a particular controversy." Id. Finally, Mengler argues that the decisions that are
required "frequently call for a delicate balancing of the probative value of an item of
evidence against its prejudicial effect." Id. Thus, Mengler argues that to address the
particular needs of the trial and the decisions that a trial judge must contend with on
a daily basis, the drafters created a "middle course," so as to "give some guidance,
through specific rules, to trial courts and litigants so that the trial process would be
sufficiently predictable." Id.
19 Waltz argues that judicial discretion can be broken down into two general
categories--guided and unguided. See Waltz, supra note 181, at 1103. Guided
discretion is provided to the trial judge where he "has some flexibility and choice in
decisionmaking but is restrained by more or less specific standards or guidelines to
which he visibly must adhere." Id.
Conversely, unguided discretion exists where judicial decision-making is
"unhedged by any formal constraints or guidelines and consequently a judge
exercising it need never worry that an appellate court will find his ruling in error."
Id. Waltz draws these conclusions by examining the occurrence of particular grants
of discretion in the Rules. For example, he notes that the auxiliary verb "may," a
word signaling discretionary power and choice, "appears thirty-seven times" over the
course of the Rules. Id. at 1104. But, unlike Rossi, who concluded that the Rules
"bristle" with discretion, see supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text, Waltz
concludes that even though "more evidentiary material is being turned over to the
factfinder under the Federal Rules of Evidence than would have been in cases tried
at common law," the Rules "are not laced with unprecedented grants of unbridled
judicial discretion." Id. at 1118.
... See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 227-28 (4th Cir. 1982)
(stating that "the appraisal of the probative and prejudicial value of evidence under
Rule 403 is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge; absent extraordinary
circumstances, the Courts of Appeal will not intervene in its resolution").
According to one study, reversals of the trial judge's decision on evidentiary
grounds occur infrequently, if ever at all. See Margaret A. Berger, When, If Ever, Does
Evidentiay Error Constitute Reversible Error?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 893 (1992). Berger,
noting that approximately forty thousand civil and criminal cases were tried in the
federal courts over a two-year period, found that only thirty cases were decided in
which "a court of appeals stated in an officially reported opinion that its reversal was
due to an evidentiary error at trial." Id. at 894. In addition to finding that evidentia-
ry reversals rarely occur, Berger concluded that the ratio of reversals in civil and
criminal cases is almost identical, see id. at 896, which is a surprising conclusion in
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Although judicial discretion exists to admit and exclude
evidence, the bounds of the Federal Rules are hardly limitless. The
Rules categorically exclude certain evidence because of its inherent-
ly prejudicial nature, such as the admission of character evidence to
prove action in conformity with such character,1" and the admis-
sion of the alleged victim's past sexual behavior in a rape case.
197
Finding the use of some evidence detrimental to public welfare, the
Rules also exclude evidence for social policy reasons, 198 such as
evidence of subsequent remedial measures, 199 compromise or offers
to compromise,20 0 payment of medical or similar expenses,
20 1
pleas, offers to plea, and plea discussions, 20 2 as well as the
existence of liability insurance.
203
light of the substantial rights at stake in a criminal trial.
" Rule 404(a) provides that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith
on a particular occasion." FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Consistent with the doctrine of
limited admissibility, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible for
corollary purposes, such as "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." FED. R. EvID. 404(b). A
discussion of limited admissibility is beyond the scope of this Comment, but for an
extensive review of the doctrine, see Daniel D. Blinka, Delusion orDespair. The Concept
of Limited Admissibility in the Law of Evidence, 39 DEF. LJ. 657 (1990).
"' Pursuant to Rule 412(a), "in a criminal case in which a person is accused of
rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, reputation or opinion evidence of the
past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such rape or assault is not admissible."
FED. R. EVrI. 412(a).
198 See FED. R. EVID. 407-411.
"' Rule 407 provides that if "measures are taken which, if taken previously would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event."
FED. R. EvID. 407.
200 Rule 408 excludes "[e]vidence of (1) furnishing or offering... to furnish, or
(2) accepting or offering.., to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount
... to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount." FED. R. EVID. 408.
201 Rule 409 excludes "[e]vidence of furnishing or offering.., to pay medical,
hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury.., to prove liability for the
injury." FED. R. EVID. 409.
'0 Pursuant to Rule 410, evidence is not admissible against a defendant who
makes "(1) a plea of guilty... later withdrawn; (2) a plea of nolo contendere; (3) any
statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure ... ; (4) any statement made in the course of plea discus-
sions ... which do not result in a plea of guilty." FED. R. EVID. 410.
203 Rule 411 proscribes the admission of"[e]vidence that a person was or was not
insured against liability.., upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or
otherwise wrongfully." FED. R. EVID. 411.
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Thus, one can argue that because the mandates of the Federal
Rules are "discretion," "flexibility," and "admissibility,"24 new
forms of evidence and technology, such as advanced videotaped
reenactments in criminal trials, 20 5 should be welcomed openly and
warmly. The Federal Rules, however, frequently exclude both
evidence that runs against public policy 20 6 and evidence that is
inherently prejudicial to a particular litigant.20 1 Professor Graham
emphasizes that "any notion that a trial court has discretion to run
roughshod over specific rules, and that the law of evidence is simply
'pick an answer' jurisprudence, could not be further from the
truth."20 8  Furthermore, the exclusionary policies prescribed by
the Federal Rules in the aforementioned instances are complement-
ed by Rule 403, which grants the trial judge authority to exclude any
evidence that is "unfairly prejudicial."
C. Rule 4032°-Crafting a Definition of "Unfair Prejudice"
1. The Rule and Its Intentions
As the cornerstone of the Federal Rules, 210 Rule 403 provides
the trial judge the ability "to exclude otherwise admissible evidence
when the probative value of that evidence is 'substantially out-
weighed' by, among other things, 'unfair prejudice. '"'211 By
attempting to eliminate unfair prejudice, the Rule strives to accom-
plish three basic purposes-the avoidance of inferential error,
21 2
2o4 See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
0 For examples of the usage of these forms of evidence, see supra part II.B.4.
2o6 See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
o7 See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
208 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A COMPREHEN-
SIVE REFERENCE TEXT 8 (1989); see also In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the
Coast of France on Mar. 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1305 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that
"[t]he Federal Rules of Evidence are statutes, and district judges may not disregard
statutes no matter how inconvenient or cumbersome they believe the Rules to be").
209 See FED. R. EVID. 403; see also supra note 178 for a description of Rule 403.
210 See supra note 180-84 and accompanying text (describing the importance of
Rule 403 in the Federal Rules).
211 Gold, supra note 181, at 497. One commentator, however, has argued that
Rule 403 is unconstitutional as applied to criminal trials and has called for its
modification. See Lewis, supra note 182, at 295. Lewis argues that the balancing test
should be reversed in criminal trials, calling for the exclusion of relevant evidence
unless the court makes a determination that its "probative value substantially
outweighs the danger [of unfair prejudice]." Id. at 352.
212 This is the key prong in analyzing the dangers presented by videotaped
reenactments. See infra part III.D.
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the promotion of real fairness in the judicial process, and the
realization of economical factfinding. 21' It can also be argued that
the intent of Rule 403 should be considered in conjunction with the
goals of Rule 102,214 which requires a determination of "truth" and
a search for "fairness."215 At its baseline, "Rule 403's primary focus
is whether the jury will use the evidence in a way that will enhance
or detract from accurate factfinding."
216
2. Balancing and Probative Value
In conducting a basic Rule 403 analysis, the trial judge must first
weigh the "probative value"217 of the particular piece of evidence
21S See Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L.
REv. 220, 226 (1976). Dolan points out that
[w]hen the prejudice rule is reduced to its components and the intent of
each of those components analyzed, these three goals are easily recogniz-
able. The rule's consideration of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
and misleading thejury addresses the first two goals, while consideration of
undue consumption of time implements the third.
Id.; see also MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EvIDENCE § 403.1, at 179
(3d ed. 1991) ("These disadvantages according to Rule 403 consist of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, misleading thejury, and considerations ofundue delay, waste
of time and the needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
214 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
9 See Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18
U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 59, 65 (1984). Gold notes that Rule 403 is subservient to the
more basic goal of Rule 102, which is "the ascertainment of truth in a context of
procedural fairness." Id. Gold also points out that "courts and commentators
recognize that Rule 102 identifies the policies that should control the exercise of
discretion under Rule 403." Id. at 65 n.18.
216 Id. at 67.
217 Commentators differ on an exact definition of probative value. Dolan notes
that probative value is a "relative concept." Dolan, supra note 213, at 233. As such,
determining the probative value of a piece of evidence "involves a measurement of
the degree to which the evidence persuades the trier of fact that the particular fact
exists and the distance of the particular fact from the ultimate issues of the case." Id.
Probative value increases as the evidence moves closer to proving or disproving an
ultimate fact or issue in dispute. See id. Conversely, probative value decreases as the
number of inferences that must be drawn in the logical chain increases. See id.
Lewis provides a less theoretical definition, observing that commentators often
disagree over how probative value should be assessed. See Lewis, supra note 182, at
315. Lewis defines probative value as "a measure of the extent to which evidence may
contribute to a more accurate factual determination" and notes that the "admission
of probative evidence ... always enhanc[es] accurate factfinding, and its exclu-
sion ... invariably detract[s] from accuracy." Id. Gold advocates a contextual
approach to defining probative value and argues it should be defined "as a product
of the logical potential of evidence in the evidentiary and cognitive context within
which it is offered." Gold, supra note 215, at 76.
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against its "potential to inflict unfair prejudice."218  Upon balan-
cing the two factors, the trial court must then determine if the
probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
219
If the trial court reaches that conclusion, it may exclude the evi-
dence. 22' The trial judge's decision to exclude or include evidence
has been given substantial deference by reviewing panels.221 One
leading commentator stresses the difficulty in accomplishing this act
of balancing: "Analyzing and weighing the pertinent costs and
benefits is no trivial task[, and w]ise judges may come to differing
conclusions in similar situations."222
218 Gold, supra note 215, at 64. As the focus of this Comment is the unfair
prejudice created by the use of videotaped reenactments, the other dangers
articulated by Rule 403-confusion of the issues and misleading the jury--can be
grouped into an "unfair prejudice" analysis and will not be discussed in detail.
219 See GRAHAM, supra note 213, § 403.1, at 179 ("Evidence which is relevant is to
be excluded only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by any of [the Rule
403] factors alone or in combination."); Gold, supra note 215, at 64 ("If the danger
of unfair prejudice 'substantially outweighs' probative value, the court has discretion
to exclude the evidence.").
0 When excluding evidence under Rule 403, courts frequently fail to conduct the
requisite balancing test. See Gold, supra note 181, at 502 ("Absent a coherent theory
of unfair prejudice, trial courts cannot meaningfully evaluate evidence on or off the
record for the presence of unfair prejudice, nor can they conduct the required
balancing test."). Gold points out that a "distressingly large number of cases
purporting to apply Rule 403 conclude that evidence is or is not unfairly prejudicial
without explaining why or even attempting to define unfair prejudice." Id. at 500.
Furthermore, Gold notes, somewhat incredulously, that "[s]till more cases utterly fail
to conduct the required balancing test or, while purporting to balance, give no hint
as to how or why a particular balance was struck." Id. at 500-01 (footnotes omitted);
see also United States v. Fleming, 594 F.2d 598, 607-08 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
93 (1979) (finding no abuse of discretion and ascribing a reason to trial court's
admission of photographs of victim's nude and bound body); MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE 547 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1987) ("Nevertheless,
discretion can be abused, and some appellate courts have urged trial courts to
articulate the reasoning behind their relevance rulings." (footnotes omitted)).
221 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 220, at 546-47 (stating that "much
leeway is given to trialjudges who must fairly weigh probative value against probable
dangers" (footnotes omitted)); see also United States v. Derring, 592 F.2d 1003, 1007
n.6 (8th Cir. 1979) ("'[T]he task of balancing the probative value of the evidence
against its purely prejudicial effect is primarily one for the trial court. And if the trial
judge in the exercise of his discretion determines that the evidence should be
admitted, we normally defer to his judgment.'" (quoting Unites States v. Hall, 565
F.2d 1052, 1055 (8th Cir. 1977))); United States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir.
1979) ("The balancing process required by Rule 403 is entrusted, in the first instance,
to the trialjudge .... and we have held that the trialjudge's discretion should not be
disturbed lightly.").
2n MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 220, at 546.
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3. Defining Unfair Prejudice
Although a measurement of unfair prejudice is essential to
issuing a Rule 403 decision, courts and commentators have
struggled to find a quantifiable definition.2 23  Generally, all
evidence presented by an opposing party is in some way "prejudi-
cial"; therefore, prejudice "does not simply mean damage to the
opponent's cause." 224 The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 403
provide some guidance in suggesting that the use of emotion in
decision-making is a relevant consideration, though not necessarily
the only consideration in measuring unfair prejudice. 2 5 On the
other hand, the use of logical reasoning should not be seen as the
key to rational decision-making, because logical flaws abound;
226
22 One commentator notes that a definition of unfair prejudice is comparable to
Justice Stewart's oft-quoted definition of obscenity, in which theJustice characterized
obscenity as undefinable but claimed, "I know it when I see it." Dolan, supra note
213, at 238 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
224 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 220, at 545; see, e.g., Real v. Hogan, 828
F.2d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The law protects not against prejudice, but against unfair
prejudice."); Crawford v. Edmonson, 764 F.2d 479, 484 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 905 (1985) ("Since most evidence presented by one party in litigation will
presumably be prejudicial to the other, in the sense that it favors the party
introducing it and damages the opposing party's case, Rule 403 requires that the
evidence sought to be excluded threaten unfair prejudice."); United States v.
Monahan, 633 F.2d 984, 985 (1st Cir. 1980) ("Rule 403 is not contravened by
evidence that might show only that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.").
25 See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note ("'Unfair prejudice' within its
context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."); see also United States v.
Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting the Advisory Committee's
suggestion in its definition of unfair prejudice).
The notion that emotional decision-making is necessarily detrimental to accurate
factfinding is disputed, however, and it is argued that the introduction of emotion
into the trial process has beneficial effects:
Equating emotion with prejudice is a mistake. While emotion can be an
improper basis for ajudgment, it can also have an acceptable, and even vital
role in reaching an accurate and fair decision. It is both unrealistic and
undesirable to expect ajury not to react emotionally to much of what goes
on in a courtroom.... In fact, the ability of twelve laypersons to interject
human sensibilities into a proceeding otherwise dominated by the cold logic
of the law arguably embodies the true worth of the jury system.
Gold, supra note 181, at 504.
22 Gold argues that "logic is not a talisman against inaccuracy and unfairness."
Gold, supra note 215, at 80. Unfair prejudice resulting from the use of logic can
occur when the logic is derived from improper premises. If a juror believes the
saying "'once a thief, always a thief" is true, then the introduction of the defendant's
prior criminal record "will logically lead to the conclusion that the defendant is
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courts have found unfair prejudice in a variety of situations.227
It has been argued that the most compelling and workable
definition of unfair prejudice is advanced by Professor Gold, who
quantifies evidence as unfairly prejudicial when it detracts from the
accuracy of factfinding by inducing the jury to commit an inferential
error.22' Another commentator asserts that the commission of
guilty." Id. Therefore, because the premise from which the logic was derived is
incorrect, "the evidence giving effect to the premise through the process of logic
leads to inaccuracy and unfairness." Id.
Gold also cites a poignant example of how logic can generate inaccurate
inferences when derived from improper premises, stating that "[t]he extermination
of European Jewry in World War II was, at least in part, the product of a ruthlessly
logical and unemotional bureaucracy operating under horrific premises." Gold, supra
note 181, at 505 n.38 (citing HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN INJERUSALEM: A REPORT
ON THE BANALrrY OF EVIL (1965)).
Lewis points out that the unfair prejudice may "demonstrate a defendant's
unsavory or immoral character, or unpopular or contemptible associations or beliefs
that could arousejuror antagonism; it may vividly portray... offensive aspects of the
charged crime.., or overemphasize negative connotations, incitingajury's vindictive-
ness." Lewis, supra note 182, at 321 (footnotes omitted). See United States v.
Williams, 957 F.2d 1238, 1244 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding harmless error in admitting
evidence that a marijuana cigarette was found on defendant at time of arrest in a
prosecution for possession with intent to distribute cocaine); United States v. Lehder-
Rivas, 955 F.2d 1510, 1516-17 (11th Cir.) (harmless error in admitting evidence of
defendant's prior deportation, transportation of prostitutes, drug use, excessive
partying and fathering an illegitimate child, in a prosecution for conspiracy to import
cocaine), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 347 (1992); United States v. Hill, 953 F.2d 452, 456
(9th Cir. 1991) (error in allowing defendant's former girlfriend to testify that she and
the defendants had used cocaine together in a conspiracy and cocaine distribution
prosecution); United States v. Columbo, 909 F.2d 711, 713-15 (2d Cir. 1990) (error
in admitting evidence that the victim had been raped and sodomized by defendant's
co-conspirator in a prosecution for conspiracy to violate RICO and to distribute
narcotics); United States v. Rhodes, 886 F.2d 375, 378-81 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (error in
admitting fraudulent checks that had not been connected to the defendant in a
prosecution for the presentment of a fraudulent check); United States v. Miller, 874
F.2d 1255, 1268-69 (9th Cir. 1989) (error in admitting evidence that defendant FBI
agent had previously sold Department of Motor Vehicles records to an FBI informant
in a prosecution for bribery and conspiracy to commit espionage).
But some commentators argue thatjudges are unable to detect and predict what
type of evidence is in fact prejudicial. See Lee E. Teitelbaum et al., Evaluating the
Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on
Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1147 (conducting an empirical study using "[m]embers of
the community, the bar, and the bench" to determine the prejudicial effect of
different evidentiary items in the context of a summarized trial). But see Gold, supra
note 215, at 61 n.5 (questioning the assumptions underlying the findings of
Teitelbaum et al.); Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOwA L. REV. 227,
291 n.306 (1988) (calling the Teitelbaum et al. study "suggestive, if poorly construct-
ed"); Waltz, supra note 181, at 1110 n.72 (arguing that the Teitelbaum et al. study is
based upon "suspect empirical data").
" See Gold, supra note 215, at 84. Lewis notes that Professor Gold's analysis
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inferential error is worse than jury "confusion" and may "mislead
the trier of fact if he is not properly equipped to judge the
probative worth of the evidence."
229
Inferential error, Gold argues, "occurs when the jury incorrectly
decides that evidence is probative of an alleged fact or event,"
210
when it is in fact not probative of that particular fact. The use of
evidence of damage to prove liability typically falls within this
category of inferential error.2 11 In this situation, evidence of
"presents a useful basis for evaluating the balancing test of Rule 403, because it
demonstrates that probative value and prejudice are not 'apples and oranges' but
rather 'apples and anti-apples,' positive and negative contributors to the search for
reliability in factfinding." Lewis, supra note 182, at 307; see also VictorJ. GoldJuly
Wobble: Judicial Tolerance ofJuty Inferential Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 391, 392 (1986)
[hereinafter Gold,Juy Wobble] (noting thatjuries are forced to deliberate "based on
illogic or bias rather than proper decision-making inputs").
Numerous other authorities have found this definition of unfair prejudice to be
particularly workable. See United States v. Currier, 836 F.2d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 1987)
(citing Gold,Juy Wobble, supra, and arguing that "[u]nfairly prejudicial evidence is
evidence having some quality that moves thejury to attribute to it excessive probative
value"); Lockwood v. A C & S, Inc., 722 P.2d 826, 839 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)
(examining various methods of determining unfair prejudice and stating that "unfair
prejudice may exist where evidence is admitted which distorts the truth but which
cannot be effectively rebutted or clarified" (citing Gold,Juiy Wobble, supra)); State v.
DeSantis, 456 N.W.2d 600, 608 (Wis. 1990) (citing Gold, July Wobble, supra, for a
discussion of Rule 403 and noting that "[e]vidence is unduly prejudicial when it
threatens the fundamental goals of accuracy and fairness of the trial by misleading
the jury or by influencing the jury to decide the case upon an improper basis; State
v. Rutchik, 341 N.W.2d 639,655 (Wis. 1984) (Abrahamson,J., dissenting) (noting that
evidence of other crimes causes unfair prejudice because it "may have so dominated
the minds of the jurors that the jurors exaggerated its probativeness, gave the other
crime evidence undue weight, and paid less heed to other probative evidence," and
noting that unfair prejudice is "a phrase rarely defined by the courts" and that Gold,
Juy Wobble, supra, should be consulted for discussion); Thomas M. Mengler, An
Application of the Prejudice Rule in Evidence: People v. Hendricks, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
507, 521-23 (arguing that there are "[n]o guidelines" for an application of Rule 403
and that "Gold's definition seems accurate as far as it goes; indeed, it may be slightly
better than [the] articulation [in the advisory notes]"); Robert G. Miceli, Deprivation
of Due Process for Physicians: The "Failure to Diagnose" Cause of Action, 33 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 859, 907 (1989) (noting that Rule 403 was designed to prevent "[m]isleading
evidence [that] may be given too much weight by the jury because it is 'seductively
persuasive'" and adopting Gold's definition of inferential error in quantifying Rule
403); J. Alexander Tanford, A Political-Choice Approach to LimitingPrejudicial Evidence,
64 IND. L.J. 831, 844 (1989) ("The second common meaning given to prejudice is
interference with the truth-seeking process. Evidence is said to be prejudicial if it
confuses the issues, confuses or misleads the jury, diverts or distracts the jury from
the facts, or causes the jurors to make inferential errors." (footnotes omitted)).
229 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 220, at 546.
220 Gold, supra note 181, at 506.
231 See id.
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damage is not probative of fault or liability, but by using the
spectacle of plaintiff's injuries to show negligence, prejudice will
occur "not because the jury has been emotionally moved by the
evidence, but because the evidence has induced an inferential
error."
23 2
Inferential error, and hence unfair prejudice, may also occur
when the jury decides "that evidence is more or less probative of a
fact or event than it is." 213 In defining this form of inferential
error, Gold notes that
the prejudicial impact of photographs of a victim's gory remains
derives from the potential such vivid evidence has to so dominate
the minds of jurors that they exaggerate its probativeness. The
fact that the evidence of this type may evoke an emotional reaction
from the jury does not necessarily make it prejudicial. There may
be nothing wrong with shocking ajury with the repulsiveness of a
crime, as long as the impression made by the evidence in question
is commensurate with its probative worth.
2 4
Professor Imwinkelried offers an analysis of Gold's concerns with
inferential error, in noting that
the juror ideally should ascribe to an item of evidence only the
probative value that the item deserves. Suppose, however, that the
judge believes that.., the jury is likely to misestimate and
overvalue the probative worth of the item. The judge may fear
that the jury will draw a stronger inference than is warranted from
the evidence. Giving the item undue weight would constitute an
inferential error.
23 5
The dangers of inferential error are particularly profound
because the error is often "subtle," occurring "when the jury
diligently pursues the issues it is charged with deciding."
23 6
Inferential error becomes "unfairly prejudicial" when opposing
counsel is unable to expose the error or otherwise negate its
2 Id.
233 Id.
' Id. This Comment is primarily concerned with this type of error, as the use of
a videotaped reenactment will have such a profound impact upon the minds ofjurors
that they will overvalue its probative worth. See infra part III.D.
2-' EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal
Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence,
41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 895 (1988) (citations omitted).
2' Gold, supra note 181, at 507. The admission of scientific evidence often falls
into this category of error, as "it is widely assumed that lay jurors overestimate the
objectivity and certainty of scientific testimony." Imwinkelried, supra note 235, at
895.
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harmful effects. 2 7 Exposing this form of error is a difficult, if not
impossible task, because the inferential error often "distorts the
truth in such a subtle way that its dangers cannot be explained to
the jury."2 8 Defining when and how inferential error occurs,
however, is a substantial undertaking.
E. Inferential Error and Judgmental Heuristics
Defining unfair prejudice as that evidence which causes the trier
of fact to commit inferential error is the first step in determining
whether evidence is, in fact, unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.
The next step in the analysis is to determine which cognitive
processes tend to cause inferential error. This requires an examina-
tion of certain cognitive learning tools239 and an application of
these concepts to a jury's viewing of a videotaped reenactment.
Individuals process, comprehend, and react to large quantities
of information each day. In order to accomplish this monumental
task, individuals rely on "judgmental heuristics" 240 to reduce
complex inferential tasks to simple judgmental operations.
241
Heuristics are "cognitive simplifying strategies used to reduce the
complexity of information that must be considered in making a
decision." 242 Through the use of heuristics, individuals are able
to sort through the mass of information they acquire each day and
make appropriate classifications and determinations. Without
heuristics, or cognitive "rules of thumb," individuals would feel
inclined to make a detailed analysis of each and every decision.
243
Although in some instances the benefit of such an analysis may
outweigh the associated costs, such as in the case of buying a car or
a house, in other instances, such as deciding which shirt to wear in
.S7 Gold, supra note 181, at 508.
238 Id.
239 See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIALJUDGMENT 17-62 (1980) (discussingjudgmental heuristics
and knowledge structures); Ward Edwards & Detlef Von Winterfeldt, Cognitive
Illusions and Their Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 235-37 (1986);
Gold, supra note 181, at 511-24 (discussing heuristics, knowledge structures, and Rule
403).
21 "Judgmental heuristics" can be splintered into two more specific categories-the
representative heuristic," see infra part III.D.I., and the "availability heuristic," see
infra part III.D.2; see also NISBETr & Ross, supra note 239, at 7-8.
2" See NISBETr & ROSS, supra note 239, at 7.
242 Gold, supra note 181, at 511.
24S See id.
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the morning or what to eat for dinner, a complex study of the
relative merits of the issue may not be worth the undertaking.
Heuristics, however, are not infallible.2 44 While heuristics may
serve to simplify available data, they "sometimes direct our attention
toward vivid, anecdotal information which may be misleading, and
away from more pallid, complex evidence which may be highly
probative." 245 The inferential error that heuristics may cause can
be illustrated through the use of the following example concerning
tree identification. In determining whether to classify a particular
plant as a tree or a bush,
a decisionmaker may wish to avoid a systematic study of the
subject plant and the science of botany in favor of a quick search
of the plant's most salient characteristics. These characteristics
can then be compared to presumed characteristics of trees and
bushes.... [A] decisionmaker may classify the plant as a bush if
it appears mature yet is only two feet high.... [T]his strategy,
while effective in many cases.., might lead to inferential error if
the decisionmaker were unfamiliar with bonsai trees.
2 46
When this mental phenomenon occurs, inferential error may follow.
1. The Representative Heuristic
Individuals frequently rely onjudgments and assessments, as evi-
denced by the bonsai tree example. 247 Use of the "representative
heuristic" permits individuals to reduce the chore of analyzing
information or events and their relationship to a series of simple
similarity judgments. Thus, individuals assign objects to one
particular conceptual category rather than another "according to the
extent to which its principal features represent or resemble one
category more than another."2 48 The bonsai tree was misidenti-
fied as a bush because the representative heuristic caused an
examination of the size of the plant and, based on a comparison




246 id. at 509.
247 See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
248 NISBETT & Ross, supra note 239, at 7.
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The representative heuristic performs many cognitive func-
tions. 249 The heuristic is employed when a decision-maker is given
a result and asked to "infer the process by which that result was
generated." 250 When this cognitive task is performed, the heuris-
tic will often suggest that the process is in some manner similar to
the result it has subsequently produced.211 Inferential error may
therefore occur, as the result may be in no way related to the
generating process and "salient features of objects or events.., are
not.., accurate indicators of the relationship between them."
2 52
The representative heuristic also allows individuals to infer
generalizations concerning a large body of data from a limited
sample. Individuals "us[e] the data at hand to make inferences
about the general characteristics.., of the population from which
those data were drawn."2 ' Applying this heuristic would enable
an individual to determine what the United States is like as a
country by visiting several towns and speaking with several peo-
ple.254 Although the heuristic might be helpful in making general-
izations, the potential to commit inferential error is strong, because
the selection of small bits of data from a vast sample may lead to a
conclusion based on unrepresentative examples.
2 55
Gold points out the potential danger of relying upon the
heuristic for this purpose, noting that "people are often insensitive
to the amount of evidence they consider and tend to be swayed by
a small amount of vivid, anecdotal evidence." 256 In arguing that
2149 See Gold, supra note 181, at 511-16.
250 Id. at 512.
" In this situation, the heuristic will infer that destructive results had culpable
antecedents and that benign results had benign antecedents. Gold notes that
decision-makers often find an individual more at fault where, after she allows her car
to roll down a hill, it ends up striking a person as opposed to a fire hydrant. See id.252 Id. at 512.
"-' NiSBErr & Ross, supra note 239, at 77; see also id. at 77-82 (discussing problems
of generalizations insensitive to sample size).
254 See id. at 77.
211 See id. at 77-82 (describing the errors caused by evaluating small statistical
samples).
"' Gold, supra note 181, at 515. Nisbett and Ross use the following example to
illustrate the effect of an individual's susceptibility to make decisions based upon
small amounts of vivid, concrete information: In a course selection situation for
introductory college students, subjects were given mean course evaluations (on a
standard scale) and were told that the results were generated from questioning
"dozens of previous students." See NISBETr & ROSS, supra note 239, at 79. Subjects
then were allowed to speak personally with two or three students who evaluated the
courses and provided comments. See id. The results of the study indicated that the
"abstract, large-sample" review had much less of an impact on course decisions than
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the inferential error caused by the representative heuristic may be
substantial, Gold postulates:
Candidates often capitalize upon this tendency in political debate,
where the wisdom of social programs is "established" not by
reference to the mass of data demonstrating their value, but by
reference to an absurdly small number of colorful case histories.
The representativeness heuristic permits voters to infer incorrectly
that, since the case histories have been taken from a larger mass
of data, those histories must be representative of the mass.
257
Applying this logic to the courtroom, the heuristic would cause
jurors to commit inferential error, because vivid individual exam-
ples, such as the case of social program successes, tend to distract
attention from a considerable amount of relevant evidence that is
more representative of the whole.258  Pratkanis and Aronson
conclude that "[a]ll other things being equal, most people are more
deeply influenced by one clear, vivid, personal example than by an
abundance of statistical data."259 Reliance upon the representative
heuristic, therefore, creates a substantial possibility of inferential
error when a videotaped reenactment is introduced, because it
presents the potential to dwarf other more probative, yet less vivid,
testimony and evidence.
260
did the small quantities of personal, concrete, and vivid suggestions. Id.
Another example of this effect can be seen when a consumer is in the market for
a car. The consumer wants a reliable, durable automobile, without regard for speed,
flashiness, or attractiveness. After researching the relevant market data that has
sampled thousands of car owners for reliability and durability, the purchaser decides
to buy a Toyota. The day before going to the dealership, the purchaser runs into an
old friend and informs her of the impending purchase. Upon hearing this, the friend
relates that she once owned a Toyota and that it was in the shop once a month, that
parts fell off while she was driving, and that she was afraid to drive it for fear of what
would happen next. As a result of this information, the purchaser puts her decision
to buy a Toyota on hold. See ANTHONY R. PRATKANIs & ELLIOT ARONSON, AGE OF
PROPAGANDA: THE EVERYDAY USE AND ABUSE OF PERSUASION 130 (1991).
" Gold, supra note 181, at 515. Ronald Reagan, dubbed "The Great Communi-
cator," frequently implicated this cognitive strategy by pointing to individual achieve-
ments to dramatize the success of his policies. See PRATKANIs & ARONSON, supra note
256, at 130-33.
" See Gold, supra note 181, at 515.
2-9 PRATKANIs & ARONSON, supra note 256, at 130.
261 See infra part III.F.1. The Hopperstad court expressed concern with the effects
of the representative heuristic, commenting that "[s]eeing the events depicted exactly
as the State's witnesses said they happened is bound to affect the jury out of all
proportion to its value as evidence." State v. Hopperstad, 367 N.W.2d 546, 549
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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2. The Availability Heuristic
When making a decision, individuals must sort through all data
that is stored in their memory. Bu't which source or piece of
information should the individual rely upon in making a mundane
or difficult daily decision? The availability heuristic is a cognitive
device that assists individuals in "simplify[ing] the process of
choosing data used in making a decision." 261  The heuristic
dictates that in making a decision, individuals are influenced by the
relative cognitive "availability" of a particular piece of data and
"[w]hen people are required to judge . . . the likelihood of particu-
lar events, they often may be influenced by the relative availability
of the objects or events, that is, their accessibility in the processes
of perception, memory, or construction from imagination."
26 2
The data to be used for the decision, therefore, will be the data
which is "most available to the decisionmaker's perceptions,
memory and imagination." 26 The functioning of the availability
heuristic can be illustrated by the commuter who wishes to
determine the probability that the morning train will reach the
station by eight o'clock in the morning. The commuter may
reliably base his prediction on a timetable listing an 8 A.M. arrival.
Often, however, there are many factors unrelated to probability
that can influence availability. If the commuter has not previously
traveled on the train in question, the fact that this train has
never... been on time may be unavailable to him. Thus the
availability heuristic... may cause the decisionmaker to rely on
data of little or no probative value. If, in relying on a timetable,
the commuter neglects to check its reliability with [a] veteran of
public transportation standing on the platform.., then using the
availability heuristic has ... caused him to ignore the most reliable
evidence.
264
There are numerous factors, however, that cause information to
become "available" to an individual, or to a jury, that are indepen-
dent of probative value and which will cause inferential error.
265
261 Gold, supra note 181, at 516.
262 NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 239, at 18.
26 Gold, supra note 181, at 516.
264 Id.
265 See NISBETr & Ross, supra note 239, at 43-62 (discussing the impact ofvividness
on inferential error); Gold, supra note 181, at 516 (stating that "there are many
factors unrelated to probability that can influence availability").
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a. What Causes Data to Become "Available"?
Data that is "available," according to the availability heuristic, is
data which is likely to be called upon in decision-making. Nisbett
and Ross have determined that "inferential weight," and hence
availability, is given to data in proportion to that information's
"salience and vividness."2 66 Information that is vivid, the logical
syllogism dictates, is information that is deemed available and is
therefore summarily used in decision-making. 267  Thus, although
vivid data or evidence is not necessarily the most probative data or
evidence, it is the information most likely to enter the inferential
stream first and be given decision-making preference.26 8 The use
of this "evidential weighing" is dangerous, Nisbett and Ross
conclude, because "the vividness of information is normally related
only obliquely at best to its true value as evidence."
269
Because vividness is the key to availability, determining "[w]hat
makes evidence vivid is ... central to determining what makes
evidence prejudicial." 21 "Vividness" has several definitions in the
cognitive context that are unrelated to its everyday meaning.
271
Evidence becomes vivid, and thus likely to attract and keep ajuror's
266NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 239, at 8 ("Information is heeded, processed,
stored, and retrieved in proportion to its sensory, cognitive, and affective salience.").
267 See id. ("[Mlore vivid information is more likely to enter inferential processes
than is less vivid information.").
2
6
1 See id.; see also Gold, supra note 181, at 518. ("Evidence which, because of its
vividness, is selected by the availability heuristic to influence a decision presents a
danger of inferential error because vividness is normally only vaguely related to
probativeness.").
Aside from vividness, there are several other factors that cause information to
be recalled in a manner unrelated to its probative value. Information presented to
the decision-maker first, or "first impressions," frequently has an "undue influence
on final judgment." NISBETr & ROSS, supra note 239, at 172. This psychological
occurrence is known as the "primacy effect in impression formation." Id. As a result
of this, Gold suggests that "the order in which evidence is presented to the jury can
affect its memorability and thus its availability in subsequent decisionmaking." Gold,
supra note 181, at 517. In addition, early-encountered evidence serves as "raw
material for inferences about what the object is like." NISBETr & ROSS, supra note
239, at 172. Thus, the primacy effect may impact the formation of ideas concerning
all subsequent evidence.
In direct contrast to the primacy effect, but having similar results, is information
presented shortly prior to decision-making. See id. But "recency effects" do not occur
nearly as frequently as do "primacy effects" and require the presence of other factors
as well. See id.
2'69 NISBE'IrF & Ross, supra note 239, at 8.
270 Gold, supra note 181, at 518.
271 See NISBETr & Ross, supra note 239, at 43-62 (discussing the impact of vividness
on inferential weighting).
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attention, when it is "emotionally interesting,"272 "concrete and
imagery-provoking," 273 and "proximate in a sensory, temporal, or
spatial way."27 14 "Concrete and imagery-provoking" vividness is
central to the inferential error that occurs when videotaped
reenactments are viewed by the jury.
275
b. Concrete and Imagery-Provoking Vividness
When evidence promotes the "imaginability" or "sensory
imagery" of the event in dispute, it is more likely to be vivid.276
Vivid information attracts attention, makes the information seem
more concrete and personal, and most importantly, makes
information more memorable. 27 Informing the jury that the
victim died of fatal injuries suffered in a car accident is less likely to
provoke a vivid response in the jury's mind than is informing them
that the victim was killed when run over by an eighteen-wheel truck
that flattened the car and crushed the driver's skull. 27 ' The effect
on the jury in this situation should be clear. In the latter descrip-
tion, the jury's instincts of concern and outrage could lead to a
desire to punish the wrongdoer or to impose compensatory
damages for such grievous bodily injury. As a result of the former




1 Id. at 45. Emotional interest occurs injurors when events involve people they
know, when events involve people about whom they have strong feelings, and when
events affect the jurors' "needs, desires, motives, and values." Id. at 46. Gold
describes emotional interest as that which is "relevant to the jury in some personal
way." Gold, supra note 181, at 518 (footnote omitted). As a result, courts generally
exclude jurors with some relation to the parties, and attorneys often strike those
jurors who they believe will have biases favoring the opposing party. See id. (noting
that "when the parties to, or subject matter of, a lawsuit are familiar to a prospective
juror, her emotional involvement is obvious and may even be grounds for disqualifica-
tion").
27 NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 239, at 45.
274 Id. at 45, 49-51. This form of vividness concerns how the data or evidence
relates to the juror. Thus, the knowledge that a bank was robbed in a juror's
neighborhood today is much more "vivid" than the knowledge that a bank was robbed
in a cross-town neighborhood last week. News of the neighborhood bank robbery will
likely have a greater impact on ajuror's impulse to punish than will news of the cross-
town heist. See id. at 49-50.
' See infra part III.D.2.b.2 76 NISBETr & ROSS, supra note 239, at 47.
277 See PRATKANIS & ARONSON, supra note 256, at 129.
278 See NISBETr & Ross, supra note 239, at 47.
See id.
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Similarly, the description "'[p]laintiff was severely injured' is not
likely to have nearly the impact of '[b]lood was gushing from the
knife wounds in plaintiff's back. ' ""' Thus, although both forms
of the testimony relate to the same event, the latter description is
more vivid, and thereby will have more of an impact on the
decision-making process. Yet vividness bears no relation to actual
liability or culpability and is likely to cause inferential error if used
as the primary source of information for decision-making.
c. The Impact of Vivid Evidence
Vivid information, which is concrete and image-provoking,
affects inferential processes through memory because it is more
readily retained and more quickly recalled.281  By impacting
memory in this manner, vivid information is likely to be "more
available for decisionmaking and more likely to be accepted as
representative of the objects or events it describes than is pallid
evidence."2" 2 Nisbett and Ross conclude: "Since more memorable
information is... more available for incorporation into infer-
ences .... the assumption [is] that firsthand, sensory information,
and even secondhand information if it is concrete and imagery-
provoking, will have more effect on inferences that occur at some
temporal remove than more pallid and abstract information will
have."
283
What are the implications of the availability heuristic and the en-
hanced recall of vivid evidence? In some situations, vivid evidence
may be highly probative of material issues in dispute, and its impact
on decision-making will be approximately equal to its probative
value.284 The dangers posed by vivid evidence occur when that
evidence's vividness exceeds its objective probative value. When
280 Gold, supra note 181, at 519.
21 See NISBETr & Ross, supra note 239, at 51.
282 Gold, supra note 181, at 519. The elevation in importance of memorable
information can also be attributed in part to the trial itself, for "in the midst of a trial
that is likely to produce many dull patches in the form of soporific depositions,
uninspired testimony, and dimly comprehended exchanges between judge and
counsel, jurors love to be entertained." Philip K. Anthony & Donald E. Vinson,
Demonstrative Exhibits: A Key to EffectiveJury Presentations, FOR THE DEFENSE, Nov.
1986, at 13, 16.
283 NISBETT & Ross, supra note 239, at 52.
284 See Gold, supra note 181, at 520 (noting that "[s]ome vivid evidence is highly
probative, makingits impact on thejury's decisionmaking roughly commensurate with
its objective probative value").
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that situation arises, the availability heuristic will cause cognitive
overreliance upon that piece of evidence and will cause unfair
prejudice to occur, because the jury will rely disproportionately on
the vivid piece of evidence. This is precisely the form of inferential
error jurors commit when they view videotaped reenactments.2 85
E. The Vividness of Videotape and Television
In order to draw the conclusion that videotaped reenactments
cause inferential error, it must first be established that the viewing
of videotapes does in fact cause vividness and enhanced availability
in the inferential process. The conclusion that individuals receive
information more effectively from visualizations than they do from
oral presentations may seem axiomatic, but psychologists and legal
practitioners frequently advance the practical usefulness of this
conclusion."8 6 In fact, the vividness of visual presentations has led
one communications expert to conclude that the use of visual aids
in the courtroom is tantamount to "creating a representative... to
send back with [the jury] into the jury room."
287
1. Sight
Individuals and jurors enhance their capability to perceive and
learn through the use of sight. Information received via sight has
a profound impact upon individuals:
From childhood, we first begin observing our parents and peers as
models of behavior. The enormous amounts of information
presented in our education process are absorbed primarily
through sight. Our reasoning and imagination are fueled by
information gathered with ... sight. Advertisers... fiercely
compete for our attention [and] [c]onsumer buying decisions for
major items.., are tremendously influenced by visual impact as
evidenced by the investment in advertising as well as product de-
sign.
288
"85 The Lopez and Hopperstad courts adverted to this type of cognitive
overvaluing in excluding the reenactments from jury view. See supra parts II.B.2.,
II.B.3.a.
"85 See infra parts III.E.1-2.
21s SONYA HAMLIN, WHAT MAKES JURIES LISTEN 383 (1985).
2 8 Symposium Panel Discussion, Communicating with Juries: Demonstration and
Discussion of Technological Advances in the Courtroom, 68 IND. L.J. 1081, 1082
(1993).
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Far more learning occurs via sight than through any of the other
senses." 9 This reality has led to the conclusion that "[i]f a lawyer
keeps in mind that [the great majority] of what Uurors] learn will be
through their eyes, he can be sure the jury will learn and remember
the facts as he wishes them remembered and render their verdict
accordingly."20 Practitioners are well aware of the benefits of
using visual presentations and are frequently advised to "show the
jury" in addition to telling them.29 1  Oral testimony is not the
primary source of information retained by jurors; visual presenta-
tions account for the vast majority of retained information.
292
2s9 A comparison of learning through the five senses reveals that sight accounts
for approximately 85% of all learning, while hearing only accounts for 10%. Touch,
taste, and smell each account for less than 2%. See William C. Costopoulos, Persuasion
in the Courtroom, 10 DUQ. L. REv. 384, 406 (1972).
2' Id. at 406-07.
291 See Hon. Charles L. Hardy, Helping Jurors Comprehend and Remember the
Evidence, in THEJURY 1987: TECHNIQUES FOR THE TRIAL LAWYER, at 467,472-74 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 340, 1987) (outlining
demonstrative techniques for lawyers to assist the jury in understanding and
remembering the evidence); Robert Seltzer, Effective Communication: Seeing is Believing,
in PRODUCT LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS 1988: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE, at 597,
597 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 361, 1988)
(advocating the use of visual presentations to communicate more effectively to
jurors); Peter Perlman, Seeing is Believing: Making Proof More Meaningful, TRIAL,June
1981 at 34, 34 (advocating the use of videotape by trial lawyers); Windle Turley,
Effective Use of Demonstrative Evidence: Capturing Attention and Clarifying Issues, TRIAL,
Sept. 1989, at 62, 62 ("Primary challenges for trial lawyers are organizing facts and
presenting them persuasively. Today, lawyers can rely on visual aids to help them
meet these challenges effectively."); see also supra part I.C.
One study measuredjuror retention of information presented in various forms
and at different times.
Method of Presentation Retention Level (%)
After 3 Hours After 72 Hours
Telling 70% 10%
Showing 72% 20%
Telling and Showing 85% 65%
The results of this study suggest that jurors retain purely visual information 100%
better than purely oral testimony. Similarly, when oral and visual presentations are
combined, jurors retain 650% more information than when presented with purely
oral testimony. See Savage, supra note 45, at 440 n.32 (quoting Weiss-McGrath
Report prepared by McGraw-Hill); see also HAMLIN, supra note 83, at 14 ("Human
tellers corroborate and embellish but are no longer the major source of informa-
tion.").
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2. Seeing Television and Video
293
Individuals enhance their learning dramatically through the use
of sight, and the visual media providing individuals with the most
cognitive information are television and videotape. Learning still
occurs through means other than sight, but "[w]ords are no longer
the primary message givers [as n]ow it is pictures that tell."294 By
the time the average student completes high school, she will have
spent more hours watching television than sitting in the class-
room.295 Almost every American household contains a television
set and the average television set is turned on for almost seven
hours per day.29  Arguably, television "has become the primary
common source of socialization and everyday information," 97 and
the media's major social function is to "influence the receiver's
cognitions, attitudes, or behavior in some desired direction."
298
Anthony and Vinson conclude, almost as a matter of fact, that
"[t]elevision, of course, is the primary source of visual learning and
information."299
Seeing a piece of evidence dramatically increases the likelihood
that it will be remembered and subsequently made available for use
in the decision-making process.300  Television and videotape,
because of their prevalence and acceptance as a form of receiving
relevant information, enhance the effects that sight has upon mental
2" The purpose of this Section is not to discuss the effects of television on
learning, but merely to point out that the viewing of television and video is vivid and
attractive, thus illustrating that we as individuals have been taught to turn to
television as a source of information produced in the form of attractive images and
vivid pictures.
HAMLIN, supra note 83, at 14.
s It is estimated that by the end of high school, the average student has watched
over 15,000 hours of television and spent 11,000 hours in the classroom. See Anthony
& Vinson, supra note 282, at 13. Another researcher has concluded that the average
American watches more than three hours of television per day and that the television
set itself is on for an average of over six hours per day. As a result, if a child began
watching television at the age of six, by the time she reaches age sixteen, she could
conceivably have watched 20,000 hours of television. See D.W. RAJECKI, ATTITUDES
391 (1990).
2 See GEORGE COMSTOCK ET AL., TELEVISION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 85, 88
(1978).
2" George Gerbner et al., Living With Television: The Dynamics of the Cultivation
Process, in PERSPECTIVES ON MEDIA EFFECTS 17, 18 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillman
eds., 1986).
' RAJECKI, supra note 295, at 392 (citation omitted).
Anthony & Vinson, supra note 282, at 13.
o See supra part III.E.1.
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recognition and retention.301 Thus, it can be concluded that when
an individual or a juror views videotaped material, that material is
in fact vivid, resulting in enhanced availability in the inferential
process and potential overvaluation in decision-making.
F. Videotaped Reenactments and Unfair Prejudice-Applying the
Heuristics
Under this analysis of the Federal Rules of Evidence, unfair pre-
judice occurs when inferential error is committed. 0 2 Inferential
error arises when jurors improperly rely on certain cognitive
processes to reach a decision. When these processes are relied
upon,jurors may incorrectly infer generalizations concerning a large
body of data from an unrepresentative sample303 or select the
most mentally available data 0 4 in order to make a decision. The
use of the videotaped reenactment in criminal trials by the prosecu-
tion unfairly implicates jurors' use of both the representative
heuristic and the availability heuristic as a result of both the content
of the reenactment and the manner in which it is presented.
1. The Representative Heuristic and the Videotaped
Reenactment
Criminal trials, with the life and liberty of the defendants at
stake, can be long, drawn-out affairs, lasting anywhere from several
hours to several weeks.305 During the course of the criminal trial,
jurors are presented with volumes of information-witness testimo-
ny, expert testimony, instructions from the bench, and arguments
from counsel.0 6 Although one seminal study suggests that jurors
generally understand the facts of the matter and correctly perceive
501 See supra notes 294-99 and accompanying text.
s See supra part IILC.3.
s See supra part III.D.1
304 See supra part III.D.2.
o The trial of the four men accused in the terrorist attack on the World Trade
Center began in October 1993 and thejury did not return guilty verdicts until March
4, 1994. See Richard Bernstein, 4 Are Convicted in Bombing at the World Trade Center
that Killed 6, Stunned U.S., N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 1994, at Al.
s6 For example, in the World Trade Center bombing trial, "it]he prosecution
based its case on circumstantial evidence ... presented in 1,003 exhibits and the
testimony of 206 witnesses, with the help of more than a dozen federal and state
agencies." Sherrie F. Nachman, 1,003 Exhibits, 206 Witnesses, and One Major Victory,
AM. LAW., May 1994, at 36, 36.
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the issues, 30 7 courts have recognized that the use of the represen-
tative heuristic will cause jurors to ignore larger bodies of evidence
in favor of more individual pieces of vivid, anecdotal evidence.
308
Nowhere in a criminal trial is the potential greater for the
misapplication of the representative heuristic than with the use of
a videotaped reenactment. When presented with the reenactment,
jurors, though frequently told that the reenactment is only the
prosecution's version of the .events, °9 are tendered, in graphic,
image-provoking form, a capsule summary of how the events of the
case transpired. The disputed issues of the litigation are presented
on television for the jurors to view. In New Jersey v. Spath,1 ° the
reenactment would have illustrated the prosecution's version of how
the victim was situated when struck by the bullet. In People v.
Mitchell,31' the reenactment presented the prosecution's version
of how the events occurred in Artie Mitchell's house on the night he
was murdered. The court in Lopez v. State3 12 cautioned against
this danger of misapplication when it commented that "whether
intended or not [a reenactment] may sway a juror who has listened
307 See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 149 (1966).
" See, e.g., United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1432-36 (6th Cir. 1986) (unfair
prejudice occurred in admitting testimony that defendant made racist remarks eight
years earlier in a prosecution for civil rights violations); LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v.
Haskon, Inc. 660 F.2d 342, 351-52 (8th Cir. 1981) (excluding tax returns where they
may have otherwise confused thejury in determining overall profits), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1019 (1982); United States v. Green, 648 F.2d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 1981)
(admission of pictures of firearms found at defendant's residence was prejudicial
error in a criminal trial even though the pictures were used for the limited purpose
of refuting the testimony ofa codefendant); see also Gold, supra note 181, at 515 n.7 8
(citing other cases presenting this issue).
'0 The effectiveness of the judicial "limiting instruction" has been sharply
questioned. Wissler and Saks have concluded that in a situation where a defendant's
prior criminal convictions are admitted for the limited purpose of impeaching
credibility, the trial judge's limiting instructions to the jury to evaluate the prior
convictions solely for impeachment purposes will not counteract juror bias. The
admission of the convictions triggers the intuitive juror belief that, "once a criminal,
always a criminal," subsequently leading to a higher rate of convictions. See Roselle
L. Wissler & MichaelJ. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use
Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 38 (1985).
Thus, applying the Wissler and Saks conclusion to this situation, it appears likely that
jurors would give little cognitive regard to a cautionary instruction from the bench
requiring consideration of the reenactment as only the prosecution's opinion of how
the events transpired.
sI' No. SGJ263908 (N.J. Super. Ct. Crim. Div. filed Dec. 5, 1990). For a further
discussion of the Spath trial, see supra part II.B.4.b.
'" No. 12462 (Cal. Super. Ct. Marin County indictment filed Sept. 17, 1991); for
a further discussion of the Mitchell trial, see supra part II.B.4.a.
2 651 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
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to lengthy testimony. " "'
The prejudice that occurs as a result of the use of the represen-
tative heuristic can be analogized to the purchase of the Toyota by
the durability- and longevity-conscious consumer.3 14 The consum-
er, prior to deciding on the purchase of a Toyota, examined a large
body of relevant evidence in the form of user surveys and mainte-
nance analyses and arrived at a preliminary decision based on the
results of that evidence. Likewise, in the courtroom, jurors are
presented with numerous witnesses, exhibits, and arguments by both
sides in order to have the relevant data available to make a
determination of guilty or not guilty. Yet in light of all of the
pallid, relevant data presented to the consumer pertaining to the
durability and longevity of the Toyota, the consumer's choice was
swayed by a small amount of relevant, yet extremely vivid, contradic-
tory evidence. In the courtroom, the videotaped reenactment-one
short, vivid summation of all the events argued and contested
throughout the course of the trial-has the same impact on juries as
does the dissatisfied Toyota customer on the potential purchaser.
The reenactment, as a result of the representative heuristic, will
likely overshadow the majority of the probative testimonial evidence
that has been presented and will improperly serve as the basis for
a decision. Inferential error is therefore committed, and unfair
prejudice according to Rule 403 will occur, as the reenactment
distracts attention from relevant evidence that is more representa-
tive of the whole body of evidence. The Lopez court, without the
benefit of an in-depth psychological analysis, used its judicial
instincts to determine the dangers accompanying the reenactment
due to juror overreliance on the representative heuristic and
properly excluded its use in future trials.315
2. The Availability Heuristic and the Videotaped Reenactment
Any time an individual makes a decision, the information that
is drawn upon for use in the cognitive processes has been acquired
from an external source. Once acquired, that information must
subsequently be recalled for use in decision-making. Which
information is most readily available to be used in rational decision-
making? The information that is most available for decision-making
"' Id. at 415; see also supra part II.B.2.
114 See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
"' See supra part II.B.2.
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is that which impacts in some personal way-whether it impacts
emotionally or provokes images which are imprinted on the mental
battlefield.
Even more so than the representative heuristic, 16 reliance on
the availability heuristic to select the information used during juror
decision-making has the potential to create inferential error and,
therefore, unfair prejudice against the defendant. This potential is
particularly relevant to a situation involving the use of a videotaped
reenactment. The heuristic dictates that the data which is cogni-
tively most available, or for the purpose of this analysis, cognitively
vivid, will be thrust to the mental forefront and be given primary
consideration in the decision-making process."1 7 Yet cognitive
availability or vividness is not necessarily tied to probative value,
and inferential error will be created when the vivid evidence is
improperly relied upon for decision-making.
18
Not all vivid evidence's probative value is substantially out-
weighed by unfair prejudice.3 19 Certain demonstrative evidence
can have probative value commensurate with its potential cognitive
availability. The presentation of the gun used to commit a murder
can have a potent mental impact upon the jury and can provide
mental imagery unmatched by any oral testimony. While deliberat-
ing, the jury will readily recall the heavy, icy, dark object that was
used to end a human life. Yet the gun, as it has been directly linked
to the crime, is highly probative, and its use during juror delibera-
tions provides insight into the actual circumstances of the crime.
The viewing of the videotaped reenactment by the jury presents
a prime example of the potential for inferential error created by the
use of the availability heuristic. The reenactment has no indepen-
dent probative value or link to the case, because it is demonstrative
evidence that is purely illustrative in nature.3 "2 Its function is
derivative, in that it is a post-event creation, prepared exclusively for
trial. Thus, the videotaped reenactment's evidentiary value differs
greatly from that of the authenticated murder weapon, which carries
-16 See supra part III.F.1.
317 See supra notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
s1s The Hopperstad court alluded to the potential impact of the availability heuristic
in holding that the viewing of the reenactment, presented exactly as the prosecution's
witnesses testified, "is bound to affect the jury out of all proportion to its value as
evidence." State v. Hopperstad, 367 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); see also
supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
"' See supra part III.C.1. (discussing the Rule 403 balancing test).
320 See supra part I.A.
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its own independent probative value. The reenactment can only be
presented in conjunction with the testimony of a witness.
In re-creating the events surrounding a plane crash in a civil
trial, 2' an expert may use objective data taken from the flight
recorder, information gathered from the flight tower, and testimony
of eye witnesses. She then may apply the laws of engineering or
physics to determine the fate of an aircraft by reconstructing the
actual details of its demise. In a criminal trial, the reenactment of
the crime scene is generally speculative and is created without the
defendant's help. 22 The prosecution develops a theory based
upon witness testimony, ballistic reports, or the circumstances of the
case, and then attempts to re-create the event in order to present it
to the jury. In the Mitchell trial, the reenactment presented to the
jury was the product of prosecutorial speculation based upon the
forensic evidence gathered from the crime scene.3 23 No eyewit-
nesses were present during the commission of the crime, other than
the defendant. 24 The reenactment is essentially a summation, a
compilation of all the witnesses who have testified for the prosecu-
tion-a compilation that is packaged into a neat, made-for-television
movie-a movie with no factual value in and of itself.
3 25
The danger of unfair prejudice presented by the videotaped re-
enactment is a function of both the manner of the presentation and
the content of the presentation. That danger is only accentuated by
its stark lack of probative value. The availability heuristic suggests
that the reenactment will be readily recalled and heavily relied upon
during the decision-making process. Individuals learn more readily
through sight, and a key component of the learning process comes
121 See supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
S" The participation of the defendant in creating the reenactment is not
necessarily a guarantee for accuracy, as defendants are generally motivated by a desire
to be acquitted. This desire functions in a similar manner to the prosecution's quest
for a conviction. See, e.g., State v. Trahan, 543 So. 2d 984 (La. Ct. App. 1989)
(upholding the exclusion of defendant's videotaped reconstruction as it conflicted
with defendant's own version of the facts), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Simpson, 551 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (La. 1989), but af/'d, 576 So. 2d 1 (1990).
'" See supra part ILB.4.a.
12' Even if the reenactment is premised upon the testimony of eyewitnesses,
similar dangers continue to exist. The accuracy of eyewitness testimony has been the
focus of much critical examination. See generally ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS &JAMES M.
DOYLE, EYEWIrNESS TESTIMONY: CIL AND CRIMINAL (2d ed. 1992).
" The Hopperstad court also opined on the subject of the reenactment's probative
value in characterizing the reenactment as irrelevant. State v. Hopperstad, 367
N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); see also supra notes 110-11 and accompanying
text.
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through the use of the television, an everyday source of entertain-
ment and information.126 A television videotape, much more than
other forms of demonstrative visual evidence, leaves a lasting
impression on juror's mental processes, since its vividness dictates
that it will be readily available for cognitive recall.12 " The video-
taped reenactment, because of its mental impressionability, is
exactly the type of vivid information to which the availability
heuristic grants cognitive priority during decision-making.
The content of the reenactment serves to enhance its vividness,
while at the same time increasing the likelihood of inferential error.
As argued in the preceding section, the jury is being presented with
a prepackaged video version of the contested issues. The reenact-
ment does not assist in clarifying corollary issues, but is presented
to be illustrative of the disputed issues-thus enhancing its memora-
bility. The impact of seeing the crime committed on television in
the manner depicted by the prosecution and its witnesses makes it
more likely that the reenactment will "be accepted as representative
of the ... events it describes [rather] than .. . pallid evidence."
328
The potential for inferential error presented by juror over-
reliance on the videotaped reenactment substantially outweighs its
probative value. The Lopez court, again using its judicial instincts
to assess the psychological landscape, touched upon all of the
relevant cognitive issues, concluding that "any staged, re-enacted
criminal acts ... involving human beings are impossible to duplicate
in every minute detail and are therefore inherently dangerous, offer
little in substance and the impact of the re-enactments is too highly
prejudicial to insure ... the defendant a fair trial."
329
CONCLUSION
Change is not necessarily for the better. Before practitioners
and courts rush headlong into the twenty-first century and usher the
use of advanced computer and video technology into the hallowed
halls of justice,3 30 they should take a moment to step back and
526 See supra part III.E.
327 See supra part III.D.2.c.
323 Gold, supra note 181, at 517.
" Lopez, 651 S.W.2d at 416. The courts in Hopperstad and Caudill also agreed
that the prejudicial psychological impact of the videotaped reenactment outweighed
its probative value. For a complete discussion of the rationales of these courts, see
supra parts II.B.2., II.B.3.a., II.B.3.c.
'" See supra part II.B.1.
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reflect upon the impact of this technology on the rights of the
criminal defendant. In allowing the use of the videotaped reenact-
ment during criminal trials, the Mitchell and Spath courts failed to
properly consider the prejudicial impact that the reenactments
would have upon the cognitive processes of thejury. The use of the
videotaped reenactment, while assisting the prosecution in present-
ing its case and meeting its burden of proof, clearly creates the
potential for inferential error and unfair prejudice as proscribed by
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Technology may be
advancing at a rate unparalleled in judicial history, but that does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that fundamental protections
created to safeguard the rights of criminal defendants must be left
in its considerable wake. Jurors may not be able to prevent the
cognitive overvaluing that occurs when viewing a videotaped
reenactment, but courts adhering to the Federal Rules balancing test
should recognize the deleterious effect the reenactment has upon
juror deliberations and return it whence it came-the editing room
of the litigation specialist.
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